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Income Tax Discrimination: Still Stuck in the
Labyrinth of Impossibility
A BST RA CT. In previous articles, we have argued that the European Court of Justice's reliance
on nondiscrimination as the basis for its decisions did not (and could not) satisfy commonly
accepted tax policy norms, such as fairness, administrability, economic efficiency, production of
desired levels of revenues, avoidance of double taxation, fiscal policy goals, inter-nation equity,
and so on. In addition, we argued that the court cannot achieve consistent and coherent results
by requiring nondiscrimination in both origin and destination countries for transactions
involving the tax systems of more than one member state. We demonstrated that -in the
absence of harmonized income tax bases and rates - the court had entered a "labyrinth of
impossibility." Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll claim to have discovered a single normative
criterion that not only resolves this dilemma, but also explains the existing nondiscrimination tax
jurisprudence of both the European Court ofJustice and the United States Supreme Court.
Although they endorse economic efficiency as the lodestar for judicial decisions regarding tax
discrimination, Mason and Knoll fail to provide any evidence that their proposed norm would
reduce tax-induced distortions more than competing efficiency norms, even in the limited
situations to which their analysis applies. In fact, their crucial, but unrealistic, assumption that
taxpayers can never change their residences from one state to another confines the actual scope of
their analysis to a very small set of cases involving cross-border workers. That analysis is further
limited by an unrealistic assumption of flat-rate taxation for individual income. Nor do they
make a convincing case that they have found the key to understanding the confusing and
inconsistent U.S. and EU judicial decisions, which are not confined to cross-border workers.
Finally, implementation of their proposed norm by legislation or litigation is not practical, given
the particular tax systems that they say would be required. In short, their proposed norm does
not provide a way out of the "labyrinth of impossibility" created by a nondiscrimination
approach to taxation of international transactions.
A UT H OR S. Michael J. Graetz is the Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia
Law School. He is grateful to the Milton Handler Research Fund at Columbia Law School and
the European University Institute for support of this Response. Alvin C. Warren is the Ropes &
Gray Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The authors would like to thank Mihir Desai,
Daniel Halperin, James Hines, Louis Kaplow, Alvin Klevorick, Peter Merrill, Alex Raskolnikov,
and Stephen Shay for helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION

The foundational treaties of the European Union establish a unique system
of government.' In general, they leave decisions about how to levy income
taxes and at what rates to the member states. If the member states agree
unanimously-a rare occurrence indeed-the European Commission, Council,
and Parliament can together issue income tax directives, but so far these few
directives have been limited to rather technical matters.' Within Europe, as
elsewhere, cross-border transactions involving income taxation are also
governed by an extensive network of bilateral income tax treaties that, while
reflecting many common principles, often vary in their details.'
In this context, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is charged with
ensuring, to the extent appropriate and practicable, that the member states'
income tax laws do not interfere unduly with the "four freedoms" guaranteed
by the Treaties: free movement of goods, 4 services,' labor,' and capital.' These
freedoms of movement were intended to create an economic market relatively

1.

Throughout this Response, we use the plural to refer to the EU foundational treaties, which
continue to evolve. The current version is the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
For further discussion of the current institutional arrangements, see generally RUTH
MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005); and Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic
Integration ofEurope, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1188-94 (20o6).

2.

For a comprehensive list of EU legislation currently in force regarding direct taxation
(including the income tax directives), see Directory of European Union Legislation in Force,

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/legisAatest/chapo920.htm (last updated Jan. 1,
European Union legislation on direct taxation). For a comprehensive
discussion of directives in force from 1998 to 2007, see Philipp Genschel & Markus
Jachtenfuchs, How the European Union Constrainsthe State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation,
5o EUR. J. POL. RES. 293, 297-300 (2011). See also MASON, supra note 1, at 22-35.
For the template for these bilateral treaties, see OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 17 (2010). In the "D" case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
rejected the judgment of the Advocate General and held that income tax treaties in Europe
need not apply a "most favored nation" approach, thus affirming the ongoing status of
varying bilateral treaties in Europe. Case C-376/o3, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Buitenland te Heerlen, 2005 E.C.R. 1-5821, I-5872. For the
EUR. UNION,
2012) (listing

3.

opinion of the Advocate General, see id. at para. 113 (opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-

Jarabo).
4.

TFEU, supra note 1, arts. 26, 28.

5.

Id. arts. 26, 56.

6.

Id. arts. 26, 45, 49.

7.

Id. arts. 26, 63. Discrimination on grounds of nationality is also prohibited. Id. art. 18.
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free of internal barriers, as well as greater social and political union within
Europe.
There is considerable tension inherent in this structure, in which each
member state retains a veto over European income tax legislation, including
proposals that would promote the cohesion of the internal market, while the
ECJ reviews the tax laws of the member states to ensure that they do not
violate the Treaties' guarantees of free movement. The national income tax
laws at issue vary across the Union, generally providing an important source of
revenue and implementing national distributive and economic policy goals in
light of each member state's economic and social conditions, as well as internal
political dynamics and conflicts. Variations in income tax laws and rates across
Europe affect taxpayers' decisions about where to work, live, and invest, as well
as tax planning efforts about where to locate income and deductions to
minimize income tax burdens.'
In the 198os, the European Court of Justice began deciding income tax
cases with an aim to strengthening the Union and to limiting the member
states' ability to favor their own residents or to favor domestic over foreign
investments.' Although there is considerable doctrinal confusion in the decided
cases, the essential construct used by the ECJ to achieve its goals is the concept
of discrimination against cross-border transactions as compared to purely
domestic transactions."o While a number of commentators, including us, have
criticized these decisions as being incoherent in terms of tax policy, doctrinally
confusing, sometimes conflicting, and constitutionally questionable in terms of
democratic decisionmaking, those decisions have no doubt contributed to the
economic, social, and political union in Europe." In recent years, the European

8.

9.

10.

See, e.g., Philipp Genschel, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Welfare State, 30 POL. &
SoC'Y 245, 259-61 (2002); Philipp Genschel, Achim Kemmerling & Eric Seils, Accelerating
Downhill: How the EU Shapes Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market, 49 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 585, 587-89 (2011).
See Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, supra note 2, at 302-03. The vast majority of income tax cases
decided by the ECJ have been brought by private litigants -most often corporationschallenging national measures. See Genschel et al., supra note 8, at 598-99. This, of course,
tends to reduce national revenues, since private parties litigate only when victory will reduce
their tax liability. Id. Between 1986 and 2003, these private litigants succeeded in more than
8o% of the cases. Id. at 599.
See, e.g., Malcolm Gammie, Non-Discriminationand the Taxation of Cross-BorderDividends,
2 WORLD TAxJ. 162, 170 (2010) (discussing the "single non-discrimination principle").

11. See, e.g.,

MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL READING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE EC

(discussing the political consequences of ECJ decisionmaking);
Ruth Mason, Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality, 2 WORLD TAx J. 126, 137 (2010)
TREATY 70-76, 110-26 (1998)
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Union has expanded to twenty-seven members, enlarging the membership of
the court and creating even greater diversity among the member states'
economies and income tax laws. After that expansion and the rejection of a
proposed European constitution, the court has become less aggressive in
striking down aspects of member states' income tax laws, accepting
justifications offered by the member states that in earlier times the court would
have rejected."
Competition in Europe has had a notable effect on income tax structures
and rates in the member states. Although efforts to harmonize income taxes in
Europe to alleviate downward pressures have been advanced since the 196os,
such harmonization efforts have proved unavailing; income tax rates and bases
differ markedly throughout the EU. Indeed, one recent quantitative study
concludes that "tax competition is stronger in the EU than the rest of the
world.""
In two previous articles, we criticized the court's income tax jurisprudence."
We argued that its reliance on nondiscrimination as the basis for its decisions
did not (and could not) satisfy commonly accepted tax policy norms, such as
fairness, administrability, economic efficiency, production of desired levels of
revenues, avoidance of double taxation, fiscal policy responsiveness to
economic circumstances, inter-nation equity, and so on. In addition, we argued
that the court could not achieve coherent results by requiring
nondiscrimination simultaneously in both origin and destination countries
when goods, services, individuals, or capital move from the first country to the
second. With regard to the latter point, we contended that-in the absence of

("The EC non-discrimination principle has been expounded primarily by the ECJ, an
institution with a clear political agenda to promote the integration of Europe.").
12.

13.

See Suzanne Kingston, The Boundaries of Sovereignty: The ECJ's ControversialRole Applying
InternalMarket Law to Direct Tax Measures, 9 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EuR. LEGAL STUD. 287, 303-10
(2007). Kingston argues that recent ECJ decisions reflect a "new, more rational balance
between direct tax and free movement." Id. at 311.
For a brief description of these efforts since 1990, see Graetz & Warren, supra note 1, at 1228
n.143. For a description of the European Commission's current project for a "Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base," see Common Tax Base, EUR. COMM'N TAXATION &
CusToMs UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/taxation/company-tax/common
tax base/index-en.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2011).

14.

Genschel et al., supra note 8, at 595; see also Wolfgang Kerber, InterjurisdictionalCompetition
Within the European Union, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S217, S234 (1999) (describing
competition as "an integral part of the constitutional structure of the European Union").

15.

Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ Makes
Tax Policy, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1577 (2007); Graetz & Warren, supra note i.
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harmonized income tax bases and rates - the court had entered a "labyrinth of
impossibility."' 6
Let us restate what we mean by this labyrinth of impossibility." The
following three principles cannot hold simultaneously in a consistent and
coherent way in the absence of harmonized tax bases and rates:
Principle i -Sovereignty

in the Origin Country: The origin country5 can

choose how and at what rates to impose income taxes on its citizens or
residents. The origin country, for example, may decide to tax all of its
residents or citizens (including individuals, resident corporations, and
other business entities, such as partnerships) at progressive rates based
on their ability to pay, as measured by their total worldwide income,
with whatever personal or family allowances the origin country deems
appropriate.
Principle 2-Sovereignty in the Destination Country: The destination

country"' can choose how and at what rates to impose taxes on income
earned within its borders. The destination country, for example, may
decide to tax individuals (or corporations) on income earned there
regardless of whether the earner is local or foreign.
Principle 3-Nondiscrimination: To

implement

the

freedoms

of

movement, equal treatment of domestic and cross-border incomeproducing labor, capital, and business activities is required in all
member states in their capacity both as countries of origin and
destination."o

16.

Graetz & Warren, supra note 1, at 1243.

17.

Id. at 1216-23.

is. In tax parlance, the origin country is generally referred to as the "residence country";
sometimes it is called the "home country."

ig. In tax parlance, the destination country is generally referred to as the "source country";
sometimes it is called the "host country."
20. For an important article that extends our "labyrinth of impossibility" beyond taxation to a

wide range of regulatory contexts, see Alexandre Sayd6, One Law, Two Competitions: An
Enquiry into the Contradictionsof Free Movement Law, 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD.

365 (2011). Sayd calls our impossibility result the "negative harmonization conundrum."
He describes the dilemma we identified as the impossibility of simultaneously achieving
"intra-jurisdictional equality" (from the perspective of the destination country) and "interjurisdictional equality" (from the perspective of the origin country) through "negative
harmonisation" (nondiscrimination jurisprudence) in the absence of "positive
harmonisation" (legislative action). Id. at 388.
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A simple example may help to illustrate the conundrum that the ECJ faces.
Assume that one country, let us call it the United Kingdom, taxes income at a
40% rate, while another country, which we shall call Hungary, taxes income at
a 15% rate. As a destination country, the United Kingdom may tax Hungarians
(as well as Britons) working there at its 40% rate. But this, of course, means
that there is an additional tax burden on Hungarians earning income in the
United Kingdom, compared with Hungarians earning income at home.
Hungarians are taxed differently when they move from Hungary to the United
Kingdom. Taking a job in the United Kingdom is not "free" movement for
Hungarians (at least in the sense of being costless), even if Hungary does not
tax its citizens residing abroad. There is clearly no obligation for Hungary to
reimburse its citizens or residents working in the United Kingdom for the 25
additional percentage points of income tax they face in the United Kingdom,
nor does any country do so. Making either Hungary or the United Kingdom
compensate Hungarians for the additional 25 percentage points of tax they pay
when they work in the United Kingdom would violate sovereignty in the origin
or destination country, respectively. Now consider a U.K. national who works
in Hungary. Forcing Hungary not to tax Britons would violate Hungary's
destination-based sovereignty, so Hungary will typically impose its is% tax on
income earned by foreigners working there.2 1 Forbidding the United Kingdom
from taxing the income earned by a British person in Hungary would violate
the United Kingdom's origin-based sovereignty (and the ECJ has said that
member states have no obligation under European law to prevent international
double taxation"), but if the United Kingdom imposes its 40% tax on the
income earned in Hungary-even if it allows a deduction or credit for the
Hungarian tax paid-Britons working in Hungary will bear a higher tax
burden than Hungarians working there.
While rate differences are important, it is not only tax rates that produce
such disparities between cross-border and purely domestic activities. Consider,
for example, a charitable organization, organized in one country (the country
of origin) that has some activities in a second country (the country of
destination) when the two countries have different criteria for favorable

21.

22.

The actual rate may vary if the foreign worker does not stay long enough to become a
resident for tax purposes, as the destination country will not have full access to the worker's
financial transactions. In that case, countries typically impose a flat-rate final "withholding"
tax on domestic income of foreign workers that is designed to approximate the tax burden
on domestic workers. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 881, 1441-1446 (2oo6) (imposing flat-rate taxes on
foreign individuals and corporations).
See, e.g., Case C-128/o8, Damseaux v. Belgium, 2009 E.C.R. 1-6823, para. 27; Case C-67/o8,
Block v. Finanzamt Kaufbeuren, 2009 E.C.R. 1-883, paras. 28-31; Case C-513/o4, Kerckhaert
v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. 1-1o967, paras. 20-24.
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income tax treatment, such as eligibility for a charitable deduction or
exemption from income taxation." Exemption in the destination country
might, for example, be based on the premise that the activities of the
organization relieve that country from having to provide certain public services
to its residents.' From the perspective of the origin country, requiring the
organization to qualify with additional requirements in the destination country
would burden cross-border activity more than domestic activity. From the
perspective of the destination country, there is, however, no extra burden
because all charities operating there must satisfy the same criteria. Attempting
to eliminate barriers to cross-border activity by requiring nondiscrimination
from the perspective of both the origin and destination countries does not
therefore provide an answer to the question of whether a guarantee of free
movement across borders means that such an organization must or must not
meet the requirements of the destination country in order to operate there.
Rather, a court presented with that question must choose between the two
perspectives.
As a final tax example, consider countries that reduce the burden of double
taxation of corporate income by providing a credit to shareholders for
corporate taxes paid on corporate earnings that are then distributed to the
shareholders as dividends taxed again at the shareholder level." When
the company operates in one country (the destination of the capital) and the
shareholder resides in another (the origin of the capital), which country should
extend the credit? If the first country refuses credits to foreign shareholders, it
is arguably discriminating against foreign investors. If the second country

23.

24.

Cf Case C-25/10, Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV v. Belgium (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=84328&pagelndex=o
&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=&cid=364959 (ruling that the denial of
reduced succession duties by one member state for contribution to a charity organized in
another member state, when the donor did not live or work in the country in which the
charity was organized, infringed the free of movement of capital); Case C-318/07, Persche v.
Finanzamt Liidenscheid, 20o9 E.C.R. 1-359, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex
=6aoo7CJo318&langs=en&type=NOT&ancre= (ruling that the denial of a tax deduction by
one member state for in-kind contribution to a charity organized in another member state
infringed the free of movement of capital); Case C-386/o4, Centro di Musicologia Walter
Stauffer v. Finanzamt Miinchen flir Korperschaften, 20o6 E.C.R. 1-8203 (ruling that the
denial of a tax exemption by one member state for rental income earned in that member
state by a charity organized in another member state infringed the free of movement of
capital).
Missionswerk, paras. 30-31 (holding that the close link between recognized charities and the
state's activities is not an adequate ground for treating a charity organized in another

25.

member state differently).
These issues are discussed in detail in Graetz &Warren, supra note 15.
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refuses credits for shares in a foreign corporation, it is arguably discriminating
against investment in foreign countries. On the other hand, if both countries
grant credits, cross-border commerce will be favored over domestic commerce.
Our point is simply that requiring nondiscrimination in both destination and
origin countries is not a satisfactory tool for resolving the conflicts between
nonharmonized income taxes and the four freedoms (or, indeed, for resolving
other basic issues of international taxation).
These kinds of cases are not, of course, limited to taxation. More than
thirty years ago, the ECJ famously decided that Germany could not refuse
importation of a French liqueur because it did not meet a requirement of
minimum alcohol content applicable to both domestic and foreign products in
Germany." To do otherwise, the court decided, would restrict the free flow of
goods produced in another member state, infringing what is sometimes called
the

principle

of mutual

recognition."

More

recently,

the European

Commission, Council, and Parliament have struggled to find an acceptable
answer to the question of when certain service providers (such as plumbers)
licensed in one member state should be permitted to offer their services in
other member states with different licensing standards." The list could go on
and on. 3o
This is not to say that there is no way out of the labyrinth we have
described. In fact, there are three ways. One might, for example, choose to
impose only the requirements of the origin country. Europe does this, for

26.

27.

See Graetz & Warren, supra note i, at 1219.

Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung flir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R.
649 (commonly referred to as Cassis de Dion). For other nontax examples, see Sayd6, supra
note 20.

28.

29.

Kalypso Nicolaidis, Kir Forever? The Journey of a Political Scientist in the Landscape of Mutual
Recognition, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAw: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAw REVISITED ON
THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 447, 451 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loic
Azoulai eds., 2010); Joseph H. H. Weiler, Mutual Recognition, Functional Equivalence and
Harmonization in the Evolution of the European Common Market and the VVTO, in THE
PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS 25, 25
(Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa ed., 2005).
The current resolution is found in Council Directive 20o6/123/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, 2oo6

O.J. (L 376) 36. A previous version played a role in the campaign against the EU
Constitution, particularly in France, where it was said that foreign service providers,
symbolized by a Polish plumber, would work in France without having to comply with
French regulations. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Trusting the Poles? ConstructingEurope Through
Mutual Recognition, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 682, 685 (2007).
30.
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example, with drivers' licenses and certain professional qualifications.31
Alternatively, one might impose only the requirements of the destination
country. European value-added taxation does this, ceding the power to tax
goods and services to the destination country." Finally, one could harmonize
the origin and destination countries' tax laws and rates. But, absent
harmonization, one simply cannot have both origin and destination income
taxation along with consistent neutrality or equality between cross-border and
domestic activity from the perspective of both origin and destination countries.
Nevertheless, Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll claim that they have
discovered a single normative nondiscrimination criterion-which they label
"competitive neutrality" -that the ECJ should be using to decide income tax
cases under the Treaties." In addition, they aver that this norm in fact best
describes the criterion that the court is using to decide such cases. They insist
that their competitive neutrality criterion offers the ECJ a way out of the
labyrinth of impossibility, and, for good measure, contend that it would also
enable the Supreme Court of the United States to craft sensible and coherent
doctrine implementing the Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clauses
of the U.S. Constitution. For Mason and Knoll, competitive neutrality is the
holy grail of tax discrimination.
The argument of their article can be summarized in eight propositions,
which we will consider in turn. (1) The paramount role of the tax
nondiscrimination principle in common markets such as the European Union
or the United States is to promote economic efficiency. (2) Three familiar
efficiency standards for the taxation of capital income can appropriately be
translated into efficiency standards for taxing labor income. (3) It is reasonable
to analyze tax discrimination on the unrealistic assumption that taxpayers
cannot change their state of residence. (4) Given that assumption, one of the
three efficiency standards, competitive neutrality, is superior to the other two.
(5) Properly understood, competitive neutrality requires a precise set of tax
rules that courts have no power or ability to promulgate. (6) Nonetheless,
courts should interpret tax nondiscrimination to require a particular partial
version of competitive neutrality in common markets such as the EU or the
United States. (7) The foundational treaties of the European Union and the

31.

See, e.g., Council Directive 91/439/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 237) 1 (pertaining to drivers' licenses).

32.

This is done by taxing imports and exempting exports. Such border adjustments put the
sales of goods and services within any particular country on an equal footing regardless of
the location of production even when there are variations in tax rates among different
member states. Philipp Genschel, Why No Mutual Recognition of VAT? Regulation, Taxation
and the Integration of the EU's Internal Marketfor Goods, 14 J. EuR. PUB. POL'Y 743, 745 (2oo7).
Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax Discrimination?,121 YALE L.J. 1014 (2012).

33.
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Constitution of the United States, as well as the decisions of the European
Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, are best understood as actually
imposing that partial requirement of competitive neutrality. (8) Because
competitive neutrality would impose obligations on both origin and
destination countries, it provides a way out of the labyrinth of impossibility.
Mason and Knoll advance their conclusions about tax discrimination by
analyzing decisions in several ECJ labor income cases, decisions that, as they
say, are relatively easy to explain.14 The exact scope of their claims is, however,
difficult to pin down. The grand title of their article and its opening pages
seem to promise a general examination of tax discrimination in the European
Union and United States. However, at some points of the article, capital
income seems to be excluded from consideration, and the subject of the article
appears to be restricted to labor income." But other parts of their article are
definitely not restricted to labor income. When, for example, Mason and Knoll
say that io% of the cases decided by the ECJ are tax cases and imply that their
analysis and recommendations apply to all such cases,36 they certainly are not
limiting their claims to labor income cases.17 Likewise, when they argue that
the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt their preferred efficiency norm," they
discuss business cases and do not limit their conclusions to labor income
cases. 9 In order to understand the implications of the analysis, we will
therefore treat their article as making both a weak claim (tax discrimination in
labor income cases should be interpreted to further a particular efficiency norm
in the EU) and a strong claim (tax discrimination in all income tax cases should

34.

Id. at 1037.

3s.

Id. at 1037-38.

36.

Id. at ioi8.

See also id. at 1022 (stating that their arguments have broad applicability due to the
pervasiveness of "legal prohibitions of tax discrimination"); id. at 1030 (stating that the
cases they discuss illustrate the controversies surrounding "EU tax discrimination
doctrine"); id. at 1o86 (stating that their preferred concept of neutrality "would advance the
EU goal to integrate the economies of Europe because it would constrain state practices
(including tax laws) that decrease competition, hamper specialization, and prevent the
exploitation of economies of scale"); id. at 1099 (stating that their interpretation of tax
nondiscrimination may be what the founders of the EU hoped to secure "by implementing
the prohibition on discrimination").
38. Id. at 1106-14; see also id. at 1021 (stating that labor cases "illustrate the kinds of state tax
practices that give rise to discrimination challenges"); id. at 1036 (stating that the goal of the
article is to get a clearer understanding of what "the tax nondiscrimination principle"
requires); id. at 1085 (stating that in the EU single market, nondiscrimination should be
interpreted to require competitive neutrality).

37.

39.

1128
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be interpreted in that way in common markets such as the European Union
and the United States).
1. EFFICIENCY AS THE NORM

Mason and Knoll view the ECJ as engaged in promoting the internal
market within Europe and explicitly adopt economic efficiency as the most
important norm for deciding tax discrimination cases. 4 o (They also urge the
same criterion for the U.S. Supreme Court in such cases.41 ) To us, this is much
too restrictive a focus for constitutional courts. We obviously agree that
efficiency is an important perspective from which to examine judicial decisions
involving economic issues. On the other hand, the ECJ's institutional role
cannot be so narrowly cabined, particularly in tax cases, where its decisions can
constrain a fundamental sovereign power and will often result in the
assignment of a part of a tax base (and the resulting revenue) to one member
state, rather than another.
Nor do we agree with Mason and Knoll that the ECJ has declared economic
efficiency to be the most important underlying value in resolving these tax
cases.4 While we have criticized the court for its institutional role in
democratic decisionmaking, as well as for not sufficiently taking into account
legitimate national fiscal and tax policy considerations beyond discrimination,
the ECJ has clearly been concerned with more than just efficiency, striking
down, for example, barriers to free movement to further greater political union
across Europe. Moreover, although the court continues to insist that it will not
consider its decisions' impact on member states' revenues, it has (as we
predicted it might") recently given more weight to member states' defenses
grounded in fiscal and administrative concerns, such as preventing taxpayer
abuses of domestic tax regimes.4 1

40.

Id. at 1034-36.

41.

Id. at 1106-14.

42.

Id. at 1036.

43.

Graetz & Warren, supra note 15, at 1602-03; Graetz & Warren, supra note i, at

1212.

44. Graetz & Warren, supra note 1, at 1253.

45. See Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, supra note 2; Genschel et al., supra note 8, at 6oo; Kingston,
supra note 12; Joachim Englisch, Tax Coordination Between Member States in the EU: Role
of the ECJ 10 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) ("In the last five years
... the ECJ has been particularly inclined to uphold discriminatory tax provisions based on
the rule of reason .

. .

. This implies that the principles of free market access . . . inherent to

the internal market concept of the Union will have to be balanced against certain national
tax policy preferences.").
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Curiously, given Mason and Knoll's controversial decision to make one
particular dimension of economic efficiency the paramount consideration for
ECJ (and U.S. Supreme Court) decisionmaking, they fail to advance any
strong normative case for doing so. Contrariwise, notwithstanding their
assertions that their preferred efficiency standard "would promote the welfare
of Europeans," 4 they insist that they are not advancing any claim that the
economic efficiency criterion they urge the courts to adopt "would do a better
job of promoting economic welfare or any specific notion of the good, justice,
or fairness than other possible interpretations that might be imposed on the
member states." 4 We are puzzled, given this, why one should endorse their
proposals. Nevertheless, in the interest of understanding their argument, let us
for now accept their focus on economic efficiency to see where it leads them.
II. THREE

EFFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX

NEUTRALITY

As Mason and Knoll note, understanding the tax nondiscrimination
principle as essentially promoting economic efficiency is insufficient to give
content to that principle because there are competing notions of efficiency."
Consider a U.K. individual or company operating a manufacturing plant in
Germany. Should the plant's income be subject to taxation by Germany, by the
United Kingdom, or by both? From the perspective of welfare economics, the
argument for taxation by only the United Kingdom, the origin country (or
residence country in tax parlance), is that taxation would not distort the
owner's decisions about where to locate the plant, achieving what is known as
"capital export neutrality." If the destination (or source) country, Germany,
also imposed a tax, capital export neutrality could also be achieved if the
United Kingdom granted a tax credit for German taxes (including taxes in
excess of the U.K. rate, which no country does).

46. E.g., Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1022. The authors also speak of the goal of the treaties
as "promot[ing] welfare" of member states and citizens. Id. at io24. In a recent article, one
of the authors, Ruth Mason, in contradistinction to this article co-authored with Michael
Knoll, considers other common tax policy criteria such as equity, administrability, and internation equity to be important to how the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECJ should approach
tax discrimination cases. Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility,
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1540, 1585-93
1599-1604 (administrability).
47.

(2009)

(equity); id. at 1593-99 (inter-nation equity); id. at

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o86 n.195. They also say that they "do not argue in favor

of a competitive neutrality interpretation for tax discrimination from economic or
philosophical first principles." Id.
48.
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The parallel argument from the perspective of welfare economics for
taxation by only the destination (or source) country, Germany in this case, is
that the tax distortion between consumption and saving would not depend on
the taxpayer's country of residence, achieving what is known as "capital import
neutrality." Source-only taxation would also put domestic- and foreign-owned
plants on an equal footing in terms of income taxation.
As Mason and Knoll acknowledge, unless countries harmonize their tax
systems and rates, capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality cannot
be accomplished simultaneously." We obviously agree, as we have used the
impossibility of simultaneously implementing capital export and import
neutrality as one example of the impossibility of requiring nondiscrimination
simultaneously in origin and destination countries.so
In recent years, the economists Mihir Desai and James Hines have argued
that ownership is another important economic choice that may be distorted by
taxation." Their analysis emphasizes that the large portion of foreign direct
investment occurring through mergers and acquisitions had largely been
ignored in the literature and focuses on productivity gains potentially available
through multinational firms. Consider, for example, a U.K. and a German
company competing to buy a French enterprise. Suppose that, in the absence of
taxation, the U.K. company had such superior management attributes and
other valuable intellectual property in the relevant sector that it would outbid
the German company, because the French enterprise would be most productive
under U.K. management. If the U.K. tax system distorted the outcome so that
the German bidder prevailed, worldwide economic welfare would be
diminished. Such a tax system would fail to achieve "capital ownership
neutrality," which would be accomplished by exclusive source-country
taxation.5
Mason and Knoll import these three familiar ideas from discussions of
capital income taxation into the domain of labor income taxation, relabeling
them "locational neutrality" (no efficiency gains from "shifting workers across

J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "OriginalIntent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1021, 1108 (1997) (illustrating the impossibility of
simultaneously achieving capital export and capital import neutrality without tax
harmonization).

49. Id. at 1020; see also Michael

so. Graetz & Warren, supra note i, at 1216-19.
si. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., EvaluatingInternationalTax Reform, 56 NAT'L
TAX J. 487 (2003).
52. Id. at 494. Capital ownership neutrality could also be accomplished by source- and
residence-country taxation as long as the latter granted unlimited foreign tax credits for
taxes imposed by the former, but no country grants unlimited foreign tax credits. Id.
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jurisdictions"), "leisure neutrality" (which obtains when "leisure is allocated
efficiently across jurisdictions" because the relevant choice for a worker is
between work and leisure, rather than between saving and consumption), and
"competitive neutrality" ("when it is not possible to increase productivity by
shifting jobs among people")."
They treat the analogue between capital and labor taxation as completely
natural, requiring little or no justification for transferring efficiency criteria that
have been developed in the former context into the latter. But this is not nearly
as straightforward as Mason and Knoll imply. The efficiency norms applicable
to capital have been developed largely in the context of multinational
corporations deciding where to invest. When labor is at issue, individuals are
deciding where to live, whether and where to work, and how much (including
how hard) to work. It is, for example, quite reasonable to assume that
corporations maximize profits, regardless of their level of income, while
individuals are generally thought to have declining marginal utility of income.
To be sure, individuals' work efforts - and, as a result, individuals'
productivity - are affected by tax burdens, but through both income and
substitution effects, making it inappropriate to take workers' productivity as
fixed in analyzing different tax regimes." This alone makes Mason and Knoll's
sharp distinction between "leisure neutrality" and "competitive neutrality"
problematic. Taxi drivers, for example, decide how much to work each day and
are well-known to work less when it rains or on holidays." Should we think of
these decisions as work-leisure tradeoffs (implicating leisure neutrality) or as
affecting productivity (implicating competitive neutrality)?
The difficulties of insisting on a sharp distinction between individuals'
work-leisure tradeoffs and those involving productivity are well illustrated by
an economic analysis of the behavior of bike messengers in Zurich, Switzerland
in response to a temporary wage increase." In this study, the wage increase

53.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1043, 1047, 1053.

54. It is not uncommon in the economics literature to assume productivity is fixed. For a
discussion of the literature and a model which examines wages differing from marginal
product for certain workers, see Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva,
Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities 15-23 (Nat'1 Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 17616, 2on), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7616.pdf.

ss.

For studies of taxi drivers' work decisions, see, for example, Colin Camerer et al., Labor
Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time, 112 Qj.. ECON. 407 (1997); Yuan K.
Chou, Testing Alternative Models of Labour Supply: Evidence from Taxi Drivers in Singapore,
47 SING. ECON. REV. 17 (2002); and Henry S. Farber, Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor
Supply ofNew York City Cabdrivers, 113 J. POL. ECON. 46 (2005).

56. Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Goette, Do Workers Work More If Wages Are High? Evidence from a
Randomized FieldExperiment, 97 Am. ECON. REv. 298 (2007).
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produced a large increase in the overall labor supply of the bike messengers,
who could freely choose how many shifts to work and how much effort to
generate. It turned out, however, that the messengers worked longer hours but
decreased their effort per shift, as measured by the number of deliveries per
shift,s7 thus confounding leisure neutrality and competitive neutrality in Mason
and Knoll's framework. The authors concluded that insights from behavioral
economics (which Mason and Knoll ignore completely) offer better
explanations of the messengers' behavior than those of neoclassical
economics.'" A variety of behavioral factors, such as the performance of fellow
workers and workplace relations between the employer and her employees,
affect individuals' decision about both how much and how hard to work."
These kinds of considerations are not similarly applicable to corporate
decisionmaking about how to allocate capital.
Moreover, individuals cannot simultaneously work full-time in, say, both
France and Germany, whereas corporations have great flexibility about their
allocation of capital between the two locations .o Acquiring a new corporate
affiliate in a foreign country does not usually require shedding one elsewhere.
Mason and Knoll's decision to apply capital ownership neutrality to
workers is especially problematic. 6 1 Desai and Hines ground their case for this
norm on productive synergies that may be achieved by multinational
companies, especially through economies of scope and scale resulting from
their intellectual property. While workers may vary in their productivity -a
particular pastry chef, for example, may be more productive than another if
hired by a particular pastry shop-it is far from obvious that the scope and

57.

Id. at 310-12.

5.

Id. at 314-15.

sq. For a good summary of the literature, see Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics:
Evidencefrom the Field, 47 J.ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009).
6o. Corporations will, of course, differ in their flexibility in this regard depending on their
ability to raise capital.
61. European analysts sometimes expressly include labor in their analyses of capital export
neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN) by relabeling them CLEN and CLIN,
respectively. See, e.g., Frans Vanistendael, In Defence of the European Court offustice, 62 BULL.
INT'L TAx'N 90 (2008). Compare Dennis Weber, Is the Limitation of Tax Jurisdiction a
Restriction of the Freedom ofMovement?, in ACCOUNTING & TAXATION WITH SPECIAL REGARD
TO TRADING IN EMISSION RIGHTS & ASSESSMENT OF ECJ CASE LAw IN MATTERS OF DIRECT
TAXES AND STATE AID 113, 118-21 (Michael Lang & Frans Vanistendael eds., 2007)
[hereinafter ACCOUNTING & TAXATION] (arguing that the ECJ should adopt CLIN as its
lodestar for decisionmaking), with John F. Avery Jones, Comments on the Conference Papers,
in ACCOUNTING & TAXATION, supra, at 135, 140-41 (arguing that CLEN would be a better
approach).
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magnitude of the differences among workers are comparable to those that
Desai and Hines postulate for large multinational corporations. Moreover, the
productivity of workers in a particular country depends on the amount and
type of capital available to workers there, as well as the efficiency of the firm's
owners. This makes the location of capital important to the productivity of
workers. It is unclear how variations in productivity due to the location or
movement of capital affect Mason and Knoll's analysis.
In addition, the capital ownership analysis of Desai and Hines is based on
very precise (and controversial) conditions, such as the assumption that a
dollar of investment that goes abroad will be offset by a dollar of investment
that comes in from abroad. Although Mason and Knoll are aware of these
assumptions of the concept they import, they do not indicate whether they
are making comparable assumptions about, for example, an exact balance
between workers entering and leaving a country.
Mason and Knoll also ignore tax differences between multinational
corporations and individuals that should be taken into account in applying
analyses of capital income taxation to labor income. For instance, individuals'
tax burdens and marginal tax rates on their taxable income often turn on
family characteristics, including, for example, the number and ages of children
and spousal income. In addition, individual tax systems frequently have
progressive tax rates, whereas the corporate rates applicable to large
multinational firms are usually flat. Mason and Knoll generally ignore these
differences and simply assume that the Desai and Hines framework can be
applied to individuals without modification. All of their tables and figures, for
instance, assume flat-rate taxation, even though graduated rates are a key
feature of labor income taxation.
Finally, the three norms discussed do not, of course, exhaust the
dimensions along which either capital or labor income taxation can distort
decisions. For example, one could imagine a capital or labor "residence
neutrality" norm, designed to reduce tax distortions of a corporation's decision
of where to establish residency or an individual's decision of where to reside.
Indeed, in previous work, Ruth Mason has herself recognized the importance
of tax distortions to where individuals may choose to live. 63 Here, Mason and
Knoll avoid consideration of this particular distortion simply by assuming that

62.

Mason & Knoll, supranote 33, at 1054 n.142.

63.

Mason, supra note 46, at 1545 (suggesting "labor residence neutrality" as a criterion); id. at
1566 ("[A]bsent a specific policy objective to encourage or discourage international labor
mobility, tax laws should not distort decisions regarding cross-border migration or crossborder work."); id. at 1577 ("Rather than simply working in a lower tax jurisdiction,
taxpayers might change their state of residence in order to escape high taxes.").
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taxpayers do not change their country of residence, an assumption that we
consider below.
Despite our substantial reservations about simply importing capital
neutrality norms into the taxation of labor income, we now turn to their
analysis based on those norms.
III. THE ASSUMPTION THAT TAXPAYERS CANNOT CHANGE
RESIDENCE

As the economists Peter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez have recently
emphasized, moving from either a theoretical mathematical model or from
calculated examples to policy recommendations -as Mason and Knoll dorequires that the "result should be reasonably robust to changes in the
modeling assumptions."6 * Mason and Knoll do not provide any precise model
from which they derive their claims. Instead, the mathematical heart of their
analysis is a series of examples, two-by-two matrices and tables that explicitly
assume taxpayers cannot change their country of residence." Even as to the
weak claim of the paper, limited to labor income in the EU, this key
assumption is unrealistic. Although the precise rules vary somewhat among the
member states, an individual generally changes residence for tax purposes in
the EU if she spends more than 183 days in another member state in any given
year. As the European Commission puts it on its website, if you "spend more
than 6 months in a year in another EU country, you will, in most cases, become a
tax resident of that country.",6 Mason and Knoll therefore base their entire
analysis on an assumption that EU citizens will not take a job in another
country if they have to live in the other country for more than six months.
While labor mobility may historically have been more limited in the EU than
the United States,'' the addition of Eastern European member states has

64.

Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to
Policy Recommendations, 25 J. EcoN. PERSP. 165, 166 (2011).

65.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1038-39.

66. Looking for Work Abroad: Taxes, YOUR EUR., http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/

job-search/taxes/index-en.htm (last updated Nov. 2011).
67. A European Commission portal aimed at facilitating job mobility indicates that about 2% of
EU citizens currently live and work in a member state other than their country of origin
(without specifying how long a period is involved). Jobseekers, EURES: EUR. JOB MOBILITY
PORTAL, http://ec.europa.eu/eures/main.jsp ?acro=job&lang=en&catId=52& (last visited
Sept. 20, 2011). When new member states are admitted to the EU, there is sometimes a
transition period that postpones full freedom of movement for a number of years for citizens
of the new member state. See id. An important initiative that is expected to improve mobility
of university graduates is the standardization of diplomas in the European Higher
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increased wage differentials, and, as a result, lower-income workers have
increasingly crossed borders in recent years. 8 In addition, migration of highly
educated (including high-tech) workers has long been of concern to many
governments, including those in Europe. 69 As for mobile, high-income
workers, including star soccer players among others, there is ample evidence
that Europeans are quite willing to change their residence, specifically in
response to lower tax rates.7 0
Whatever one thinks of the assumption that taxpayers cannot change their
residence for purposes of the paper's weak claim, that assumption is patently
implausible for purposes of any stronger claim. Mason and Knoll do not
suggest any reason to suppose that owners of capital (whether individuals or
companies) are unable to change their residences (or places of incorporation).
Nor do they offer any reason to believe that American workers do not move
their residence from one state to another.7 1
Given its implausibility, why do Mason and Knoll assume that residence is
fixed? The justification offered is that cross-border discrimination for workers

Education Area, begun by the Bologna Process in 1999. See Mobility, EUR. HIGHER EDUC.
AREA, http://www.ehea.info/article-details.aspx?Articleld=13 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
68. Jennifer Gordon, Free Movement and Equal Rights for Low-Wage Workers? What the United
States Can Learn from the New EU Migration to Britain, U.C. BERKELEY L. SCH., CHIEF JUST.
EARL WARREN INST. ON L. & Soc. POL'Y (May 2011), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
img/GordonIssueBrief May_2011_FINAL.pdf.
69. International Mobility of the Highly Skilled, OECD OBSERVER, July 2002, at 1 (describing
important intra-regional migration of the highly skilled in Europe).
Camille Landais, LeBronomics: Do Taxes Really Affect Location Decisions of High-Paid
Workers?, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL'Y RES. (Jan. 2011), available at http://siepr.
stanford.edu/system/files/shared/pubs/Policybrief jan20n1.pdf (finding that the level of top
tax rates has a large impact on the migration decisions of EU soccer players); Henrik
Kleven, Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, Taxation and International Migration of
Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16545, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/W16545.pdf [hereinafter
Kleven et al., Taxation and InternationalMigration of Superstars] (same); Henrik Kleven et
al., Taxation and International Migration of Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigner Tax
Scheme in Denmark (2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/
kleven-landais-saez-schultzli11iidenmark.pdf [hereinafter Kleven et al., Taxation and
International Migration of Top Earners] (finding large response of foreigners changing
residence due to a special lower top rate income tax scheme in Denmark). For a summary of
trends of growth in labor mobility, see Mason, supra note 46, at 1547-50.
71. Census data suggest that about 13% of the U.S. population moves every year and that about
40% has moved over a five-year period. See GeographicalMobility: 2000 to 2005, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU tbl.1 (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/cps/files/
cps2005-5yr/tabol-1.xls; GeographicalMobility: 2oo9 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.1 (May
Over a
2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/cps/files/cps201o/tabo1-oi.xls.
five-year period, about 7.7% have changed their state of residence.

70.
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can come about only when a worker resides in one member state and works in
another, because moving across the border would subject a worker to residence
taxation in the state of his new home." While the situation of "cross-border
workers" (the term used by the authors)73 who do not move is undoubtedly a
subject worthy of analysis, that subject is remarkably confined when measured
against the grand project promised by the article. Of the ECJ tax discrimination
cases, fewer than a quarter (or only about 2% of the ECJ's total cases) involve
labor income.74
Having made the assumption of fixed residence, Mason and Knoll analyze
a series of cases using two-by-two matrices in which workers face different tax
regimes. The results in each case depend on the assumption of fixed
residence.7 ' These matrices do indeed represent the situation of cross-border
workers, but we do not see how any general implications about tax
discrimination can be drawn from them. The assumption of fixed residence
obscures the risks of tax-induced distortions to choices of residence, which
should be included in any realistic analysis of the economic efficiency
consequences of tax discrimination. As Mason and Knoll put it in their
discussion of pure residence taxation, their assumption that residence is fixed
relieves them from even considering the very real possibility that individuals or
corporations shifting their residence across jurisdictions may increase output.76
It also means that the different residence-based tax rates in their examples are

72.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1038-39. Mason and Knoll claim that the tax treatment of a

French resident who moves to Germany is no longer a concern of EU law. Id.
73.

See, e.g., id. at 1031.

74.

For a comprehensive list of the ECJ direct tax cases, see European Court of Justice Case Law,
EUR. COMM'N TAXATION & CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/

common/infringements/caselaw/index en.htm (last updated Nov. 16,
Genschel et al., supra note 8, at 598-6oo.

2011).

See also

75.

Consider, for example, just two of the cases Mason and Knoll examine in detail. In one
instance, they analyze German and French residents who work in both Germany and
France, when the only tax is an origin-based income tax on a country's residents wherever
they work. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1049 fig.3. This produces a different tradeoff
between labor and leisure for German and French citizens when the applicable tax rates are
20% and zero, respectively. This conclusion, however, depends on assuming away the
possibility that a German worker would move to France or would remain there for more
than six months to benefit from the French tax rate of zero. In another instance, they
analyze a German income tax applied only to French residents working in Germany,
concluding that the tax will distort only French residents' decisions about where to work. Id.
at 1056 fig.4. This conclusion also depends on assuming away any possibility that a French
worker would move to Germany or would remain there for more than six months to benefit
from the zero German tax rate. Their entire analysis is grounded in such immobility.

76.

Id. at 1047.
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of no relevance for cross-border workers' decisions about where to work, since
no one can change their residence to take advantage of lower rates.
The assumption also obscures the possibility that the location of jobs may
change, making it impossible in the absence of a formal model to sort out the
effects of such a change from a change in which worker is performing the job.
The entire analysis of the article is concerned with enhancing the ability of
more productive workers to cross borders to work, but we know that many
jobs may move across borders. If one is focused on income tax burdens on
labor productivity in Europe, as Mason and Knoll are, one should surely
consider cases where production may be relocated. Indeed, in today's global
economy, capital moves faster than labor, and there may well be only a
relatively small minority of tasks that can be performed only in a specific
location.79 Moreover, the productivity of workers, which is the factor that
Mason and Knoll regard as of overriding importance, depends crucially on how
much real capital they have to work with.so Clearly, Mason and Knoll do not
intend their analysis and conclusions to be limited to migrant workers crossing
borders temporarily to immobile jobs, such as the olive pickers who come to
the Mediterranean states each fall, but such workers are representative of the
cases that they analyze and where their crucial assumptions actually hold.8'

As Mason and Knoll indicate, see id. at 1047-51, differences in residence tax rates may, of
course, affect choices between saving and consumption or between work and leisure. For
further discussion of the limited role that tax-rate differentials play in their analysis, see
infra notes 121-137 and accompanying text.
78. Mason and Knoll do not explicitly consider the possibility of jobs moving until they reach
the possibility of nonuniform taxes. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1055-60. On the other
hand, the subsequent numerical example of nonuniform taxes (Table 4) seems to depend on
workers changing where they work, rather than jobs moving. See also id. at 1071 n.170.
77.

79. Michael Spence & Sandile Hlatshwayo, The Evolving Structure of the American Economy and
the Employment Challenge,

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS

(Mar.

2011),

available at

http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CGSWorkingPaperl3_USEconomy.pdf
(documenting the increasing transfer of jobs out of the United States, other than in the
nontradable sector dominated by government and health care).
8o. See, e.g., Hans-Werner Sinn, EU Enlargement, Migration, and Lessons from German
Unification, 1 GER. ECON. REv. 299 (2000), http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/showdp.asp
?dpno=2174 (providing lessons from German unification- emphasizing capital
movements -for European policy regarding labor migration); Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka,
Fiscaland MigrationCompetition (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16224,

81.

July 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6224.pdf (modeling productivity differences
among workers based on differences in capital-labor ratios).
The two ECJ decisions chosen "to illustrate the controversies surrounding EU tax
discrimination doctrine" both involve cross-border workers. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33,
at 1030-33.
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Although the assumption that residence never changes effectively confines
the actual analysis of the article to cross-border workers," we want to continue
considering the article's argument on its own terms, so we now turn to the case
for competitive neutrality, keeping in mind that assumption.
IV. THE NORMATIVE

CASE FOR COMPETITIVE

NEUTRALITY

Since Mason and Knoll's norms of locational neutrality, leisure neutrality,
and competitive neutrality lead to different income tax design decisions, how
should a policymaker or judge choose among them? Because these norms
depend on a welfare economics framework, the choice presumably should
depend, at least in part, on how much distortion occurs along each dimension,
which, in turn, depends on the underlying supply and demand conditions,
including the relevant elasticities. For example, one important long-standing
result in economists' comparisons of capital export and capital import
neutrality is that the former is more apt when the supply of capital in source
and residence countries is fixed, while the latter is more apt if the demand for
capital is fixed." When neither of those extreme conditions is met, countries
are often described as compromising between these two efficiency norms.14
In any event, a policy decision based on an economic efficiency standard
should be grounded in evidence as to the magnitude of the various distortions.
Accordingly, economists who prefer capital export neutrality over capital
import neutrality generally believe that tax-induced locational distortions are
greater than tax-induced savings distortions.' So, for example, in addressing
the question whether the United States should forgo residence-based taxation

82. Late in the article, footnote 170 states that even if the assumption of fixed residence were

relaxed, uniform taxes would still implement competitive neutrality under certain
circumstances. Id. at 1071 n.170. The reasoning in the footnote is so abbreviated that we
cannot evaluate its generality, but if the assumption of fixed residence is not necessary to the
authors' argument after all, we wonder why the reader has been led through a multitude of
matrices and examples in which that assumption is determinative of the outcome.
83.

Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of InternationalInvestment Income, 94 OJ.
ECON. 793, 795 (1980).

84. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
UnsatisfactoryPolicies, 54 TAx L. REv. 261, 269-73 (2001).

85. E.g., U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY 23-54 (2000); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON

TAxATION, 102D CONG., FACTORS AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE
UNITED STATES 248 (Comm. Print 1991) ("A policy that reduces all tax rates (applied to
domestic and foreign source income equally) is superior [on efficiency grounds] to a policy
of equal revenue cost that reduces tax rates only on foreign source income.").
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in order to achieve capital import neutrality in the interests of reducing
economic distortions, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has
concluded that a "tax rate on outbound investment lower than the tax rate on
domestic investment can only increase economic welfare if the improvement in
efficiency from the increase in saving is greater than the reduction in efficiency
from the misallocation of savings."8116 Not surprisingly, when Mihir Desai and
James Hines proposed capital ownership neutrality (on which Mason and
Knoll's concept of competitive neutrality for labor income rests), they
emphasized empirical studies of the behavior of multinational corporations,
suggesting, in that context, that tax-induced ownership distortions are large
and important.1 Surprisingly, Mason and Knoll concede that, even within the
context of the three neutrality benchmarks they discuss, many economists
would view violations of locational neutrality as having the largest negative
welfare consequences."

Peter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez have emphasized that economic
analyses are relevant for policy only if the economic mechanism "is empirically
relevant and first order to the problem at hand."'9 Importantly, a number of
sophisticated economic and legal analysts read the evidence here as
inconclusive, not pointing in any clear direction as to which version of capital
income neutrality is a more important efficiency norm for tax design, whether
by a legislature or a court."o In addition, economists have found that the
appropriate efficiency norm may vary depending on the extent to which
foreign and domestic activities complement or substitute for one another and
how capital expenditures are treated. 9 '

86.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note

85, at 247.

See, e.g., Desai & Hines, supra note 51, at 491-92. But see Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership
Neutrality, Ownership Distortions,and InternationalTax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV.
53, 6o-66 (20o6) (contesting the import of the empirical evidence).
88. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o98.
87.

8g. Diamond & Saez, supra note 64, at 166.
go. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on International Tax
Reform, 59 TAX LAw. 649, 66o-6i, 680-89 (20o6); Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler,
Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income, in
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 319, 320 (John W.
Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) ("[N]one of these benchmarks is satisfactory
because the argument supporting them usually takes place within very simple models."); see
also Kane, supra note 87, at 6o-66 (finding empirical evidence inconclusive); Stephen E.
Shay, Ownership Neutrality and Practical Complications, 62 TAX L. REV. 317, 323-24 (2009)
(same).
91.
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Mason and Knoll concede that their versions of competitive neutrality
would violate locational neutrality or leisure neutrality, giving rise to
distortions along those margins.92 They nevertheless choose competitive
neutrality over locational neutrality and leisure neutrality as the superior
efficiency standard for judging tax discrimination. Remarkably, they fail to
offer any evidence whatsoever that the distortions that would be prevented by
competitive neutrality are greater than the distortions that would be prevented
by the other two efficiency benchmarks they analyze and reject, even given
their unrealistic assumption of fixed residence. 93 Nor do they offer any
theoretical reason to conclude that competitive neutrality is the superior
standard for efficiency.
We obviously agree that differences in member states' income taxes may
distort decisions as to which worker gets which job (or which company owns
which enterprise), but, just as obviously, these taxes may distort locational
decisions about both where to work or reside and where to locate capital by
both individuals and corporations. Such differences may also distort the
tradeoffs between work and leisure (which, as we have described, may become
conflated with productivity) and between saving and consumption. It is not
possible on economic efficiency grounds to privilege one potential set of
distortions over others without any comparison of their relative magnitudes.
For example, if jobs are in fact more mobile than workers, distortions from the
absence of locational neutrality may be more important to economic efficiency
than those from the absence of competitive neutrality. Without such evidence,
we simply cannot know whether a norm based on enhancing workers' ability to
compete for jobs across borders is more welfare-enhancing than the other
efficiency norms.
In discussing normative arguments, Mason and Knoll say at several points
that they are not arguing that competitive neutrality would best promote EU
welfare because more intrusive measures, such as harmonization, might be
more welfare-enhancing,1 in part because such measures might also promote

http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/symposia/Documents/LockwoodMD%20CF
%2ofinal%2ov3.pdf.
92.

93.

94.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1074.
Id. at 1o86 n.195 ("[W]e do not argue that a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination would do a better job of promoting economic welfare or any specific
notion of the good, justice, or fairness than other possible interpretations that might be
imposed on the member states.") In a recent article, Ruth Mason herself acknowledged that
"more empirical evidence is needed to guide states' choice between the competing mobility
benchmarks," which she describes as bearing on "where taxpayers work, how much they
work, who works which job, and where workers reside." Mason, supra note 46, at 1559.
Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o86 n.195, 1098.
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locational and leisure neutrality. Fair enough; the authors are under no
obligation to consider every possible tax policy. On the other hand, having
explicitly adopted the economist's concept of welfare" and having defined and
extensively analyzed three competing welfare norms, they surely owe the
reader an efficiency-related explanation for choosing one of the three as the
superior efficiency norm. The authors frequently characterize their argument as
merely "interpretive,"' but that characterization does not relieve them of the
obligation to provide a cogent reason for urging a particular welfare norm. As
indicated above, their view is that efficiency is and should be the key focus of
the ECJ in deciding tax discrimination cases. Given that view, we cannot
understand how they can advocate one of three diverging pathways to greater
efficiency without explaining why that pathway is likely to produce superior
efficiency results.
Mason and Knoll do suggest several non-efficiency advantages of
interpreting nondiscrimination to require competitive neutrality: increased
predictability, promotion of representation reinforcement and political unity,
avoidance of legislative decisions, resolution of open questions, and, they
claim, a way out of the labyrinth. Some of these results -such as increased
predictability, greater certainty through resolution of open questions, and
avoidance of legislative decisions-would obtain under any of the three
neutrality (or other) standards.97 And some, such as promotion of
representation reinforcement, avoidance of legislative decisions, and greater
political unity (again offered without any evidence) depart from their
insistence that enhancing economic efficiency in an internal market is and
should be the court's prime focus. Moreover, none of these asserted advantages
addresses the question of why competitive neutrality is the superior
benchmark, even if one limits the analysis to the economic efficiency norm they
urge.
Despite the foregoing shortcomings of the article's normative claims for the
competitive neutrality standard, we shall now examine Mason and Knoll's view
of the tax laws that would be required to implement that standard.

95.

Id. at 1040.

96. Id. at 1087.
97.
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V. THE TAX LAW REQUIREMENTS

OF COMPETITIVE

NEUTRALITY

In one section of their article,9' Mason and Knoll use concrete examples to
argue that certain taxes violate competitive neutrality and therefore reduce
economic welfare. To clarify the authors' argument, let us begin by providing a
straightforward statement of what we understand to be the underlying logic
(which includes the usual assumption that markets will achieve efficient results
in the absence of taxation).99

Definition: "A tax system is competitively neutral when it is not
possible to increase productivity by shifting jobs among people.""oo
Proposition 1: The economy will allocate workers among jobs in
different countries on the basis of relative differences in certain
"retention' rates and ratios.1 o' More precisely, in the simple two-state,
two-job, two-worker examples in the article's tables,'o2 the relevant
ratio is that between the amount of labor income that a worker would
retain after all taxes if he worked in one country (call it country A) and
the amount that worker would retain after all taxes if he worked in the
other country (call it country B). The workers will sort themselves so
that the worker with the higher A/B ratio will work in country A, while
the worker with the higher B/A ratio will work in country B.o 3
Proposition 2: In the absence of taxation, the foregoing sorting of
workers will satisfy the definition of competitive neutrality.0 4
Proposition 3: Certain tax structures will modify the ratio of the
retention ratios that would obtain in the absence of taxation, thereby
modifying the allocation of jobs among workers.'

98.

Id. at 1060-72.

99.

Id. at 1040.

100. Id. at

101.

1053. While here we take this definition as given for the purpose of understanding the
logic of the authors' argument, we note that the vagueness of the definition leaves us
somewhat unsure about its relationship to the authors' definitions of locational and leisure
neutrality and to the relationship of leisure to competitive neutrality. See our discussion
supra Part II.
See Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1046 n.121.

102.

Id. at 1o60-72.

103. Id. at 1o61-62.
104. Id.
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Conclusion: Such tax structures do not therefore satisfy the definition
of competitive neutrality. QED.
To reach the foregoing conclusion, the three propositions obviously have to
be demonstrated, rather than merely asserted. Mason and Knoll provide two
versions of the argument: an algebraic version in the notes and a verbal version
with examples in the text (as supplemented in the notes). We begin with the
algebraic version because the authors state that it is more general."o0 As far as
we can tell, there is no demonstration in that version of propositions i and 2,
which the notes simply assume to be true."o7
We now turn to the verbal argument and the related tables. In the most
concrete statement of the argument, we have two workers, Frangoise and
Giinther, who are said to sort themselves between a job in Germany and a job
in France based on the retention ratios described above. There are indeed some
verbal examples in the text that are used to argue for propositions 2 and 3
under some circumstances.Os More importantly, there is a final example (Table
4 on page 1069) with actual retention ratios that is said to demonstrate how a
tax that changes those ratios will result in a reshuffling of jobs (and therefore a
reduction in economic welfare)."o' Readers who verify the arithmetic will be
surprised to learn that the authors' conclusion apparently holds only if the
employer does not maximize profits."o The authors say nothing about this

105. Id. at

106.
107.

108.

1063-64,

1069-71.

Id. at 1o67 n.163.

At one point, the authors declare that competitive neutrality "requires" ratios that would
satisfy proposition 1,but that is only a further definition or assumption, proving nothing.
Id. at 1o61 n.154. Footnote 163 does some of the work of proposition 3 by using algebraic
reasoning to show that certain tax structures do not disturb the ratio of ratios. The careful
reader of The Yale Law journalwill, however, see immediately that proposition 3 cannot lead
to the conclusion above without some showing that propositions 1 and 2 are true.
Id. at 1o62-69.

iog. Id. at lo69.
110.
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A profit-maximizing German firm will compare how much Giinther and Frangoise will each
produce for the firm with how much each will cost the firm in salary. According to Table 4,
Giinther will produce ioo if he works in Germany. In order to attract Giinther to Germany,
the German firm must meet (or slightly exceed) the after-tax income Giinther would retain
if he took the competing job in France. Giinther's after-tax income in France is 40. The
German firm would therefore have to pay him 55.56 for Giinther to retain 40 after paying
the 20% German source tax (11.n1) and the lo% German residence tax under the ideal
deduction (4-45) postulated in Table 4. The profit to the firm would thus be 44.44 (or
slightly less) if it hired Giinther. On the other hand, Frangoise will produce 150 for the
German firm. In order to attract her to Germany, the German firm must meet (or slightly
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peculiar result and assert that "employers will hire the worker with the largest
relative difference between productivity and wage.""' But why would an
employer do that if it would reduce profits? (In their example, profits would be
maximized if an employer focused on the absolute difference between a worker's
output and wage."m) For Mason and Knoll, the answer apparently lies in this
mysterious sentence found a few pages earlier:
Assuming that there are many Frangoises and Giinthers and that
employers are not restricted to hiring a fixed number of employees, but
rather trying to produce a given output at least cost, then employers
will select employees with the greatest relative difference between their
wage and their output."'

We admit that we are uncertain what the components of the clause beginning
with "Assuming" are meant to communicate. Do the many Frangoises have the
same or different characteristics? Do we have to assume fractional Giinthers?
These questions are not addressed or answered by the authors. Without
convincing answers to such questions, the "then" clause of this sentence once
again simply assumes propositions 1 and 2 in the argumentative structure we
laid out above. " It may, of course, be possible to describe an economic model

exceed) the after-tax income she would retain if she took the competing job in France. Her
after-tax income in France is 64. The German firm would therefore have to pay her oo for
her to retain 64 after paying the 20% German source tax (20) and the 20% French residence
tax under the ideal deduction (16). The profit to the firm would thus be 50 (or slightly less)
if it hired Frangoise. A profit-maximizing firm would hire Frangoise (for profits of 5o) rather
than GUnther (for profits of 44.44). Mason and Knoll conclude the opposite, saying that the
German firm would employ the less productive Giinther, rather than the more productive
Frangoise.
iii.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o69.

112.

See supra note n1o.

113.
114.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o62.
For readers who want more, we propose a final thought experiment to test whether the
authors have demonstrated what they claim in this section. Consider the very simple Table i
(on page 1062), which shows results for Frangoise and Giinther in the absence of taxes. We
understand the conclusion that Frangoise will work in Germany because of her higher
productivity there. Now let us introduce a very low nonuniform source tax in Germany that
applies only to foreign workers. Assume the rate is o.1%. Such a tax will, of course, affect the
relevant ratios and the ratio of ratios. The authors insist at many points that such a
nonuniform tax will therefore change the sorting of jobs. Id. at lo68-70. (Indeed, they also
assert that no one else has ever before made this point. Id. at 1o69 n.165.) But as far as we
can tell from the facts presented in Table 1, Frangoise will keep working in Germany because
her higher productivity there makes her more valuable to her employer than the less
productive GUnther, even though the ratios have changed. Perhaps the mysterious sentence
quoted in the text accompanying note 113 would change the result, but the authors provide
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with continuous functions that satisfies the sentence quoted above, but the
authors do not do so. It might also be possible to construct a discrete example
that illustrates that sentence without assuming that firms do not maximize
profits, but the authors have not done that either.
We are not therefore asserting that someone might not be able to write
down a demonstration of the propositions identified above. All we have shown
is that Mason and Knoll have not done so. Mathematically trained tax
economists tend to prefer models (often with continuous functions) that
carefully specify assumptions and then reason to conclusions based on
mathematical analysis. Verbally trained tax lawyers tend to prefer written
arguments that carefully specify assumptions and then reason to conclusions
based on verbal analysis (often with discrete examples). Mason and Knoll's
argument does neither. The algebraic expressions in the footnotes might lead a
mathematically challenged reader to think that the claimed conclusion had
been demonstrated, but that algebra simply assumes key parts of the argument.
The same is true of the verbal argument, at least as far as we are able to parse it.
Although the tables and algebra in their article do not actually demonstrate
Mason and Knoll's proposition that certain taxes violate competitive neutrality,
let us nevertheless examine their view of what tax laws would implement that
concept. Competitive neutrality, they say, requires either of two income tax
systems. One alternative is that all residence countries would adopt worldwide
taxation with unlimited credits for income taxes paid to source countries."'
Whenever the source-country tax rate is higher than the residence-country
rate, this system would require the residence country to refund to its taxpayers
the additional amounts they pay abroad. As Mason and Knoll note, under such
a system, source-country taxation becomes irrelevant to competition."'
However, no country has such a tax system, nor will any country enact such a

the reader no reason to think that the unspecified assumptions made in that sentence are
plausible. Perhaps an assumption that the firm in Table 1 does not maximize profits would
also change the result, but the authors provide the reader no reason to make such a strange
assumption.
115. Id. at 1o6o. The idea of efficiency gains from worldwide taxation with unlimited tax credits
was originated by Peggy Brewer Richman (later Musgrave) in the 196os. See PEGGY BREWER
RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1963);
PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES
AND ARGUMENTS (1969).

n6. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o6o. Mason and Knoll note in footnote 152 that

eliminating source-country taxation would also satisfy competitive neutrality, but they rule
this out as unrealistic because no country forgoes source taxation. They do not indicate why
they regard unlimited foreign tax credits as realistic even though no country has such a
credit.
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system, because no country is willing to sacrifice its revenues from taxing
domestic activities to refund higher-rate income taxes paid to another country.
Mason and Knoll's second alternative for achieving competitive neutrality
is for all countries to tax both residents and nonresidents on a source basis and
then to tax residents again on their worldwide income, with a deduction from
that income for the source tax they paid at home or abroad. Mason and Knoll
call this "the ideal deduction method," which includes the possibility of simply
exempting all foreign income." 7 The deduction and exemption versions of the
ideal deduction method are, however, as unrealistic as the unlimited credit
proposal. Their proposed mandatory two-tier system does not exist in Europe,
the United States, or anywhere else as far as we know. Although dividing
taxation of residents into two tiers (source and residence) has been discussed in
the past, it has generally been rejected by taxing authorities as too complicated
for practical administration." The second possibility, exemption of foreign
income, would be simpler, but is equally unrealistic. Many developed countries
exempt foreign-source dividends paid by subsidiary corporations to their
parents, but foreign-source earnings are not generally wholly exempt from tax
in the residence country.
To achieve Mason and Knoll's preferred norm of competitive neutrality, all
the member states of Europe (and presumably all the states of the United
States) would have to adopt an income tax system that none now has. And all
would have to adopt exactly the same system (but each could set its own rates).
Of course, as the authors concede, "the choice of how to tax cross-border
income is a legislative question.""' A unanimous vote of the member states
would be required for any such change to occur at the European Union level.
Neither the European Court of Justice nor the U.S. Supreme Court has the
legal authority to require that states adopt any of these very specific taxing
systems. Implementing either system would require the court to harmonize
their methods of taxing cross-border income by imposing the same system on
all states. Nothing could be more antithetical to the European Treaties'
assignment of primary authority over income taxation to the member states,
including the unusual requirement of unanimity.
Finally, let us say a word about the limited role of tax-rate differentials in
Mason and Knoll's analysis of competitive neutrality. Earlier we indicated that,

Id. at 1064.
118. See, e.g., PETER ANDREW HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION AND
117.

ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES:

A COMPARISON

OF IMPUTATION SYSTEMS

447-50 (1996) (discussing the "composite tax principle").
lig. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1075.
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in the absence of a formal model, the assumption of fixed residence made it
impossible to sort out differences between changes in the location of jobs and
changes in the worker performing the job.' When applied to Mason and
Knoll's concept of competitive neutrality, that assumption also obscures the
effect of differences in tax rates in any realistic tax system. Under the unlimited
credit they postulate, differences in source taxes become irrelevant to foreign
investors because of credits and refunds in the residence country. Under their
exemption alternative, residence taxes are assumed to be levied at the same
(zero) rate. Under the ideal deduction, the assumption of fixed residence
assumes away the effect of differences in tax rates on where taxpayers might
choose to live or organize their businesses. The diminished role of rate
differences under their standard of competitive neutrality is thus a function of
unrealistic presuppositions (fixed residence, zero rates, unlimited credits and
so on). In any more realistic setting, tax-rate differentials play a much more
significant role, as many European commentators have observed with respect
to both labor and capital income."' The limited role of rate differences is thus
surprising in an article that begins by postulating that taxes are the only thing
that matters in workers' decisions about "where to work, how much to work,
and which job to work.""'
Of course, the courts-whose decisions concern Mason and Knoll-have no
ability whatsoever to affect tax rates or to redress any economic dislocations or
effects on EU welfare that differing tax rates may induce. As they acknowledge,
"the ECJ has expressly held that cross-border tax disadvantages arising from

120. See supra Part III.

121. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Paper: Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM
(2001) 582 final (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/

122.

resources/documents/company-tax study-en.pdf (finding rate differences to be the most
important corporate tax distortion within the EU); Kleven et al., Taxation and International
Migration of Superstars, supra note 70 (finding that the level of top tax rates has a large
impact on the migration decisions of EU soccer players); Razin & Sadka, supra note 8o
(considering effects of tax rates net of benefits in home and host countries).
Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1038. They recognize, of course, that many other factors are
crucial to these decisions; indeed, they list thirteen others, including wage differentials,
which are particularly large among EU member states. One estimate is that wages in the
first group of Eastern European countries admitted to the Union ranged from 8%to 23% of
those in Western European member states, such as Germany. Sinn, supra note 8o, at 299. In
2003, hourly wages in the accession countries were only 14% of those in Germany.
Hans-Werner Sinn, EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution, 5o CESIFo ECON.
STUD. 685, 686 (2004). Mason and Knoll assert, without any analysis or evidence, that
adding these factors would not "dramatically" change their results. Mason & Knoll, supra
note 33, at 1038 n.98.
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rate differentials do not constitute discrimination.""' But since tax rates (or tax
rates net of social insurance and other welfare benefits) may be the most
important tax factor in the individual and corporate decisions being analyzed,
this creates a conundrum both for the ECJ and for Mason and Knoll. For the
ECJ (as we and others have shown), it results in confusing, contradictory, and
changing patterns of decisions. And it necessarily plunges Mason and Knoll
into a second- or third-best world in analyzing and evaluating the efficiency of
the ECJ's nondiscrimination jurisprudence.
Up to this point, despite its unreality, we have accepted the operation of
Mason and Knoll's two-tier ideal deduction as presented in their article, but
that presentation is confined to flat-rate taxes. Earlier, we pointed out some of
the ways in which individual income taxes differ from the corporate income
taxes analyzed in the Desai and Hines papers on which Mason and Knoll are
relying. " This is one instance in which those differences preclude simple
importation of the Desai and Hines framework, because unlike corporate
income taxes, individual income taxes are often progressive and depend on
family circumstances, such as the number of children or a spouse's income.
The authors never show how their ideal deduction would work with graduated
tax rates, so all we can do here is tentatively raise a couple of potential
problems.
One problem is that the taxpayer has to identify the graduated marginal
rate applicable to each slice of income in order to compute the relevant
retention ratios. Although the authors do not say so, the ideal deduction
method in their concrete examples seems to boil down to taxing each item of
income at a total tax rate (t,), which is the arithmetic sum of the source tax rate
(ts) plus the residence tax rate (tr) minus the product of those two rates.12 s The
after-tax amounts are then the basis for the retention ratios calculated in the
article for Frangoise and Giinther."' The tax rates used to compute (1-tt) are

straightforward in the flat-rate examples used by the authors.

123.
124.

125.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1029.
See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
According to the definition of the ideal deduction method, a taxpayer who receives an
amount of income (I) retains after paying source taxes (t,) and residence taxes (tr) the
following amount: I-tsI-tr(I-tI), which is equivalent to I-(t,+tr-trts)I. Interested readers can

confirm that in Tables 3 and 4 (on pages io66 and

1o69),

the taxpayers in each case retain

(1-tt) of their income where t,=t,+t,-tstr.

u26. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at

1o69.
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On the other hand, if residence taxes are graduated,"' identifying the rate
applicable to a slice of income can be problematic. As Mason and Knoll are
concerned with marginal incentives, they are interested in the marginal rate of
residence taxation. Notice, however, that if there is more than one source
country, the residence tax under the ideal deduction is a function of the source
tax rates in all those source countries, so we are unclear how the marginal rate
for each country is to be sorted out. Indeed, a change in one country's source
tax rate will affect the total residence tax and therefore possibly affect the
amount of residence tax attributable to income produced in another country.
Consider, for example, a taxpayer who earns half her income (Cio,ooo) at
home where the source tax rate is io% and the other half (fio,ooo) abroad
where the source tax rate is 5%. Now assume that her residence tax is
graduated, so the rate is 15% on the first io,ooo and 30% on any income
above that. Under the authors' ideal deduction, total residence taxable income
will presumably be C18,500 (:9500 from abroad and 4E9000 from home), so
the residence tax due will be C4050 (15% of4E1O,OOO plus 30% of f85oo). But

how much of that residence tax is attributable to the foreign income? Is it half
(because the foreign and domestic pretax amounts are equal) or 95/185
(because that is the portion of total after-source-tax that is from abroad)?
Alternatively, are we to assume that the foreign income is stacked first (subject
to only the 15% rate) or second (subject mostly to the 30% rate)? Without an

answer to these questions, the taxpayer cannot make the calculations that
Mason and Knoll indicate are a predicate to achieving competitive neutrality.
Now assume that the residence country reduces its source tax to zero.
Residence taxable income is now C19, 5 00 (#i9500 from abroad and io,ooo
from home), so the residence tax due will now be 64350 (15% of C10,000 plus
30% of C95oo), for an increase of 4Eoo. How much of that increase should the
taxpayer attribute to the foreign income when she calculates her retention
ratios? Half (because the foreign and domestic pretax amounts are still equal)
or 95/155 (because that is now the portion of total after-source-tax from
abroad)? Alternatively, if we assume, as above, that the foreign income is
stacked first, there is no change in the amount of residence tax attributable to
the foreign income because that income is still subject to the 15% rate. If, on the
other hand, we assumed that the domestic income was stacked first, some of
the increase in the residence tax is attributable to the foreign income, because
the entire 15% bracket is now taken up by the domestic income, so that all of
the foreign income is now in the 30% bracket. The authors never address how

127.

Mason and Knoll assert in note

249

that the ideal deduction method is consistent with

graduated residence and flat-rate source taxes. Id. at 1103 n.249.
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the total tax from earnings in each country is to be calculated when residence
taxes are graduated;1" so we do not know how the retention ratios are to be
computed even in this simple kind of case. Readers interested in more
complicated cases might think about an opera singer (subject to graduated-rate
residence taxation) who has offers to perform in twenty countries (with
different rates of source taxation) during a period in which she has time for
only ten performances.
It is, of course, appropriate to limit discussion of an idea (such as the ideal
deduction) to particular assumptions (such as flat-rate taxation) for purposes
of analysis. Here, however, Mason and Knoll go much further and claim that
their analysis produces policy recommendations for tax legislation and
jurisprudence. 29 One such recommendation is that the ideal deduction
provides the easiest pathway to the harmonization necessary for competitive
neutrality in the EU.'o Given the absence of any explanation of how that
deduction would operate in tax systems with graduated rates, we do not see
how this recommendation is germane to actual EU taxes. Indeed, the
disconnect serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of importing an
analytical framework from taxation of multinational corporations (usually at
flat rates) into taxation of individuals (often at graduated rates) without
working through how that framework would have to be modified to take into
account differences in the two environments."'

128.

Mason and Knoll simply assume the existence of a "total tax" rate without explaining how it
is calculated. Id. at 1o67 n.163.

129.

Id. at 1075-76.

130.

Id.

131.

A second problem created for the ideal deduction method by graduated rates is the exact
scope of the authors' requirement that the source tax be "uniform," bywhich they mean that
"source taxes are imposed at the same rate and upon the same base for both resident and
nonresident workers." Id. at 1o68 n.164. Once again, Mason and Knoll do not consider the
implications of graduated rates for this limitation. Recall that the ideal deduction method
includes the possibility of simply exempting foreign income (so there are no residence
taxes), which is said to be the simplest version of the method. Id. at 1c65 n.161. If we take
the article's statement of the uniformity limitation seriously, we do not see how, for
example, a country that chose to exempt foreign income (therefore levying only a source
tax) could both (a) tax individual income produced by its residents within its borders at
graduated rates, taking into account spousal income or children's circumstances, and (b)
apply flat tax rates to income earned within its borders by nonresidents. Suppose a French
and German resident both work in France, which does not tax foreign income, but applies
graduated rates to the combined income earned in France by a French husband and wife.
France has no way of knowing how much income the German worker's spouse earns from
working in Germany or anywhere else. How can it possibly impose a tax on the German
worker "at the same rate and upon the same base" it uses for the French couple?

1151

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

121:1118

2012

The authors do not discuss the kind of case we put forth here, but in very
brief comments on progression late in their article, they do indicate that
coupling graduated-rate residence taxation of worldwide income with flat-rate
source taxation of nonresidents would not be incompatible with competitive
neutrality."' Under that standard, graduated-rate residence taxation could be
joined with flat-rate source taxation of nonresidents only in countries that had
adopted the ideal deduction, which would require a residence country to apply
its flat-rate source tax to its own residents before then applying its graduatedrate residence tax to those residents.' Given the failure of the article to address
more generally the possibility of graduated rates, all we can say with confidence
at this point is that the restriction of the examples, tables, and figures to
proportional taxes leaves the implications of the analysis for individual income
taxation with graduated rates largely unknown.
To summarize, Mason and Knoll present two tax systems that would
satisfy their standard of competitive neutrality: worldwide residence taxation
with unlimited foreign tax credits and the ideal deduction method (which
includes the possibility of exempting foreign income). Neither alternative is
realistic: none exists anywhere. Mandatory adoption of either alternative in all
twenty-seven EU member states would require unanimous agreement of the
member states and implies an unrealistic level of harmonization. As for the
ideal deduction method, how it would operate in the context of graduated rates
has yet to be explained. The required departure from the political
understanding enshrined in the Treaties and the unrealistic assumptions of
competitive neutrality confirm our view that constitutional courts should not
be making tax policy based on abstract and contradictory principles of
nondiscrimination. Mason and Knoll's view is different: after conceding that
courts cannot implement the neutrality concept that they prefer, they then go

This is a well-known problem in international income tax design. One possible solution
is that all taxpayers reveal to every country in which they earn any income the amount of
income they earn in any other country, with the total income then divided among all the
countries on a fractional basis. See generally Kees van Raad, Nonresidents-Personal
Allowances, Deductions of Personal Expenses and Tax Rates, 2 WORLD TAX J. 154 (2010)

(describing "fractional taxation"). As Mason and Knoll indicate elsewhere in their article,
that possibility is not, however, practical. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1027 n-56. When
discussing their ideal deduction, the authors avoid addressing these kinds of issues, because
they use only proportional rates in the examples and tables used to explain their ideal
deduction. If they mean to prohibit a country from exempting foreign income and coupling
graduated-rate source taxation of residents with flat-rate source taxation of nonresidents,
such a prohibition is not evident.
132. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1103-04.
133.
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on to suggest that judges may nevertheless promote that concept by
interpreting prohibitions against discrimination in a certain way, to which we
now turn.
VI. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL VERSION OF COMPETITIVE
NEUTRALITY

Despite admitting that courts are incapable of fully implementing the
requirements of competitive neutrality, Mason and Knoll still argue that both
the ECJ and the Supreme Court should strike down legislation by interpreting
nondiscrimination requirements as if competitive neutrality were a
constitutional requirement. Specifically, they urge that income tax laws should
be struck down whenever they involve "nonuniform" source or residence
taxes.' 3 4 There is no indication that this advice is limited to labor income cases
involving cross-border workers. To avoid confusion between the actual
requirements of competitive neutrality advanced by Mason and Knoll and the
related constitutional standard that they urge courts to apply, we will call the
latter "partial competitive neutrality." For readers who are unwilling to
embrace competitive neutrality, Mason and Knoll also identify partial versions
of locational neutrality ("uniform residence taxes") and leisure neutrality
("uniform source taxes" with no residence taxes) that they say constitutional
courts could apply.
At this point, we are mystified by what theory of constitutional
interpretation Mason and Knoll have in mind. Having chosen efficiency as the
paramount norm for constitutional interpretation in this area, they have urged
one efficiency concept- competitive neutrality- over competing formulations,
albeit without providing any empirical (or theoretical) basis for the choice.
Then, after conceding that courts do not have the legal or institutional
competence to implement the requirements of the concept they favor, they
nonetheless urge courts to elevate competitive neutrality to constitutional
status. Mason and Knoll ask courts, to the extent of their ability, to invalidate
legislation that fails to conform in a particular, partial way to the authors'
competitive neutrality concept. For us, the institutional and conceptual gaps
between the assumed constitutional norm (efficiency) and the proposed

134.

Id. at 1075-76. Mason and Knoll define a uniform source tax as a tax applied by the source

country "to all workers with income from its territory, regardless of the workers' residence."
Id. at 1045. A uniform residence tax is a tax applied by a country "on the same basis to all
residents, regardless of the source of their income." Id. at 1047.
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interpretative standard (uniformity) alone are simply too great to make the
connection compelling as a matter of constitutional law.1s
Finally, is it clear that using partial competitive neutrality as a
constitutional standard will necessarily reduce distortions and advance
competitive neutrality, even on the assumption that taxes are proportional,
rather than progressive? Formulation of this partial concept endorses certain
attributes of competitive neutrality (uniformity) and suppresses others (for
example, their two-level tax with an ideal deduction). Why then should we
conclude that the former necessarily advances the overall goal of improving
efficiency, even though the latter cannot be required? Without more analysis,
we are not convinced that partial competitive neutrality will always advance
competitive neutrality. Indeed, the theory of the second best shows that in the
presence of other distortions, it cannot be assumed that reduction of any one
economic distortion will always increase overall welfare. , 6 Consider, for
example, a residence country, let us say Poland, that adopts a limited foreign
tax credit. Due to the foreign tax credit limitation (which is not consistent with
competitive neutrality, but which is both universal in credit countries and

135.

In their discussion of how the courts should apply the recommended standards, id. at 107685, the authors once again fail to work through the consequences of their analysis for a
world in which individual income is taxed at progressive rates, taking into account family
circumstances. Consider again the case we put forth supra note 131: A French and German
resident both work in France, which exempts foreign income, but applies graduated rates to
the combined income earned in France by a French husband and wife. In accordance with
standard international practice, France decides to tax the German resident working in
France using a flat rate because it does not know her economic situation outside France.
Assume that the European Court of Justice is to apply the partial competitive neutrality
construction of nondiscrimination favored by Mason and Knoll. The judicial standard to be
applied is that France must "assess uniform source taxes or uniform residence taxes, or
both." Id. at 1078. As France has no residence tax, its source tax must be uniform, which
means that if France wants to tax the German working in France, it must do so at the same
rate and using the same tax base it applies to the French couple. But as we indicated above,
that is an impossible task for France, because it does not know how much the German
citizen's spouse earns in Germany or anywhere else. Above, we were discussing an analytical
standard proposed by the authors. Here we are discussing the constitutional requirement
they derive from that standard. For Mason and Knoll, it would apparently violate the
European Treaties or the U.S. Constitution if a state enacted an individual income tax that
exempted foreign income and combined graduated-rate source taxation of residents with
flat-rate source taxation of nonresidents. We express no view as to whether such a tax
system would be sensible, but we certainly do not think it should be constitutionally
prohibited.

136.

R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON.
11 (1956).

STUD. 11,

In Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1099 n.235, the authors recognize the

difficulty of making definitive statements about welfare in the presence of other distortions,
but do not indicate how that affects their analysis.
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beyond the scope of judicial invalidation in Europe and in Mason and Knoll's
framework), Polish individuals and companies may decide not to compete for
projects in a higher-tax source country for which they have a comparative
advantage, distorting who works at those projects and who owns them. In
order to induce Polish and other foreign individuals or companies to bid on
projects within its borders, the source country might respond by lowering its
income tax only for foreigners (or in a bilateral tax treaty only for Polish
individuals and companies). As we understand Mason and Knoll, the ECJ (and
the U.S. Supreme Court) should strike down the nonuniform favorable source
tax as a violation of partial competitive neutrality, even if the nonuniformity
simply offsets another distortion, thereby promoting competitive neutrality
overall.'37
VII. THE POSITIVE CLAIM FOR COMPETITIVE

NEUTRALITY

Mason and Knoll argue not only that competitive neutrality should be
adopted as the judicial standard of tax nondiscrimination in common markets,
but also that the European Treaties' four freedoms and the decisions of the ECJ
are consistent with competitive neutrality, but not with locational or leisure
neutrality.'" They claim that this convergence with their preferred norm can be
discovered in both the text of the freedoms and the ECJ's jurisprudence,
including the court's overall approach to tax cases.
Needless to say, imputing a particular economic concept, such as
competitive neutrality, to constitutional documents, such as the EU Treaties,
and to an extensive set of constitutional decisions striking down national laws
would be a daunting task. To be convincing, the exercise would presumably
include examination of preparatory documents, analysis of a multitude of tax
cases, comparison with nontax cases decided on comparable grounds, and so
on. Mason and Knoll do not undertake that massive task, nor will we. Instead,
we restrict our comments here to why we do not find convincing their
arguments that the text of the freedoms and the ECJ's approach to tax cases

137.

The ECJ case law is confusing and has changed over time regarding when discriminatory
taxation of a cross-border transaction in one member state will be upheld if offset by tax
advantages in the other member state. Englisch, supra note 45, at 16-17. The ECJ has made it
clear, however, that it will not impose a most-favored-nation requirement in bilateral tax
treaties within Europe. See Case C-376/o3, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Buitenland te Heerlen, 20o5 E.C.R. 1-5821, paras. 49-63. See
also the discussion of "reverse discrimination," infra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.

138. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at lo87-97.
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accord with competitive neutrality, but not with locational or leisure
neutrality. 9
To begin with, there are simply too many counterexamples that come
immediately to mind. To take but one example, neither the ECJ nor the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidates legislation that advantages foreigners over residents
or cross-border transactions over domestic ones. Such "reverse discrimination"

139.
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Mason and Knoll make two other arguments that the ECJ's jurisprudence is consistent with
competitive neutrality, but not locational or leisure neutrality. First, they argue that the idea
that discriminatory taxes harm particular parties aligns only with competitive neutrality. Id.
at 1092-93. They say that violations of locational neutrality do not create winners and losers
(even relative winners and losers), but harm everyone. They apparently have in mind the
idea that high taxation of capital in one country could be shifted to workers there (resulting
in lower wages) and cause capital to flow to lower-rate countries (reducing the marginal
pretax rate of return for capital in those countries). Id. While we agree that the incidence of
any tax must take into account taxpayer reactions, there is no reason to believe that those
reactions would mean that all taxpayers are harmed to the same extent by violations of
locational neutrality. Suppose, for example, residence country R decides to tax foreign
income significantly more heavily than domestic income. We think that an R company that
engages primarily in foreign commerce will be disadvantaged more than an R company that
engages primarily in domestic commerce. It is certainly true that the ensuing taxpayer
adjustments (e.g., more capital remains at home in R, perhaps reducing the marginal rate of
return to all R companies) may affect all taxpayers. But the same is true of taxpayer
adjustments in response to violations of competitive neutrality. Suppose higher taxes in R
cause an R company to lose a bidding contest to acquire a company in source country S
(where there is no local tax) to a competing company from low-tax country L, when the R
company would have outbid the L company in the absence of taxation due to the R
company's greater expertise in the S company business. We agree that the R company is
disadvantaged, but that is not the end of the story. As in the previous case, there will also be
taxpayer adjustments here that need to be taken into account. Workers at the S company
may have lower wages because L management is less efficient than the R company
management would have been. All investors in R may earn a lower rate of return on their
investment, because the R company capital remains at home, increasing the supply of capital
there. Without a fully specified model of the relevant relationships, there is simply no logical
basis for claiming that only competitive non-neutralities harm particular parties.
Second, Mason and Knoll argue that the two labor income decisions analyzed in their
article provide "anecdotal evidence that the ECJ does not interpret the nondiscrimination
principle to require locational neutrality or leisure neutrality," whereas those decisions could
be reconciled with competitive neutrality. Id. at 1093. The authors do not put much weight
on this argument, a judgment we share, particularly since the holdings of the two decisions
are strongly criticized elsewhere in the article. See id. at 1093-96 (criticizing the holding of
Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Kln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, that personal
benefits must be available at least "once somewhere" as inconsistent with competitive
neutrality); id. at 1094 n.218 (characterizing the facts in Case C-385/oo, De Groot v.
Staatssecretarisvan Financien, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11819, as violating both locational and leisure
neutrality, but not competitive neutrality).
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is very controversial in the literature,1 4 o but the ECJ has "consistently refused"
to strike down such provisions, 141 even though they are clearly nonuniform
under Mason and Knoll's definition. This refusal is not surprising. As Mason
and Knoll themselves suggest, the nondiscrimination doctrine is a means to
remove "direct tax obstacles to the EU common market" and to preclude
member states from enacting "with impunity all sorts of nonuniform tax laws
that burdened nonresidents and interstate commerce more heavily than residents
and domestic commerce."14 Despite legitimate policy concerns, it is difficult to
argue that the nondiscrimination requirement of the EU Treaties is concerned
with limiting member state actions that favor nonresidents. Surely, benefits to
nonresidents fail to raise concerns about the lack of political representation
similar to those that occur when nonresidents are being disadvantaged.
Moreover, as Miguel Maduro has observed, accepting the home-country
principle (mutual recognition of residence-only regulation or taxation) reflects
the "acceptance of reverse discrimination.""' In income taxation, the so-called
"Beckham law" in Spain, which provides favorable income tax rates for foreign
professional soccer players, may be the most famous example of reverse
discrimination.'" Nonuniform "patent boxes," which reduce the rate of
corporate tax on income derived from patents (and, in some cases, from other
intellectual property), are also common in Europe.s14 And since 1991, Denmark
has applied a temporary (three-year) top marginal rate of 25%, rather than its
standard 59% top rate, to highly paid foreigners who migrate to Denmark.14

140.

See, e.g., Sayd6, supra note 20, at 401-03 (discussing the acceptance of reverse discrimination

in the EU).
141.

142.

143.
144.
145.

146.

See id. at 401.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1o86 (emphasis added). Mason and Knoll also express the
typical concern with protectionism, id. at 1022, and with nonresidents or residents with
foreign source income receiving "worse tax treatment" than residents, id. at 1o29 (emphasis
added).
MADURO, supra note i,

at 131.
and InternationalMigrationof Superstars, supra note 70, at 2.
Taxation
al.,
et
See Kleven
See, e.g., Jim Shanahan, Is It Time for Your Country To Consider the "Patent Box"?,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 4 (May 23, 2011), available at http://download.pwc

.com/ie/pubs/2011-is it-time-for-your-country-to-consider-the-patent-box.pdf.
Countries that have implemented a patent box regime include Belgium, France, Hungary,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain. The United Kingdom has announced its
intention to adopt a patent box regime effective in 2013. Id.
For a description of the Danish system and its success in attracting highly skilled or highly
compensated foreigners to Denmark, see Kleven et al., Taxation and International
Migration of Top Earners, supra note 70. The Danish regime, which taxes residents' income
based on their country of origin and the duration of residence, is obviously a nonuniform
residence tax in Mason and Knoll's lexicon.
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Despite their obvious failure to meet Mason and Knoll's requirement of
uniformity, none of these laws has been held to violate the EU Treaties.
The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise sustained discrimination in favor of
nonresident corporations over resident corporations, while invalidating
discrimination in favor of resident over nonresident corporations, 4 7 prompting
one leading treatise to observe that the constitutional guarantee of equality
"was not designed to protect the wolves from the sheep."'. Although the
Supreme Court has occasionally struck down provisions providing incentives
for local investments and jobs,149 the Court has also made it clear that the
Constitution "does not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to
encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and
industry.""so
In addition, Mason and Knoll assume that the free movement of portfolio
investment (by shareholders) is fully sufficient to achieve locational neutrality
for direct investments (of corporate capital). On that assumption, they conclude
that application of the freedom of movement to both portfolio and direct
investment in the Treaties must mean that capital ownership neutrality is being
protected, because freedom of movement for direct investment is unnecessary

(1959) (sustaining an exemption

147.

Compare Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.

148.

for nonresident but not resident corporations from the state's property tax for merchandise
stored in a local warehouse), with Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949)
(invalidating a tax on accounts receivable owned by foreign corporations while exempting
similar accounts receivable owned by residents and domestic corporations).
3.05[2] [a] (3d ed.
1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION

522

2004).
149.

429 U.S. 318 (1977). For a comprehensive
discussion of the case law, see generally Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce

See, e.g., Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n,

Clause Restraintson State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996).

U.S. at 336. The Court's most recent encounter with state tax incentives
designed to encourage local economic development involved review of the controversial
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler,Inc.,
386 F. 3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), which struck down Ohio's income tax credit for new in-state
investment on the ground that it discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of
the Commerce Clause, but at the same time sustained the state's personal property tax
exemption for new in-state investment over Commerce Clause objections. The U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the portion of the decision striking down the income tax credit on
the ground that the plaintiffs, taxpayers who objected to the "corporate welfare" the state
was providing to DaimlerChrysler, lacked standing to pursue their claims in federal court.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (20o6). At the same time, the Court denied the
taxpayer's petition for certiorari from the portion of the opinion that sustained the tax
exemption. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 547 U.S. 1147 (2006). While the Court did not
reach the merits of either claim, its disposition of the issues, at a minimum, reflects the
continuing incoherence of the law in this area.

150. Bos. Stock Exch., 429
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for locational neutrality."' Mason and Knoll provide, however, no support
from the economics literature for their extraordinary assumption. Nor do they
identify the market conditions necessary to reach the conclusion that freedom
of movement for portfolio investment (by shareholders) would efficiently
eliminate all capital locational distortions (by companies), so that freedom of
movement for direct investors would not be necessary to achieve locational
neutrality. Those conditions are likely to be unrealistic. As Mason and Knoll
indicate, many economists are likely to view violations of locational neutrality
as having greater negative welfare consequences than violations of leisure or
competitive neutrality."s2 On efficiency grounds alone, a more plausible reading
of the freedom of movement is therefore that the goal of locational neutrality
for corporate investment cannot be simply ruled out as superfluous.
Mason and Knoll also say that interpreting nondiscrimination as locational
neutrality would preclude the exemption method of taxing international
income, because locational neutrality requires residence-based worldwide
taxation with unlimited tax credits.'s Similarly, they contend that interpreting
nondiscrimination as leisure neutrality would preclude residence taxation,
because leisure neutrality allows only source taxation.'54 Since the ECJ
decisions clearly permit both the exemption of foreign income and residence
taxation without unlimited credits, they conclude that the decisions cannot be
regarded as implementing either principle. In the traditional language of
international tax policy, the court's decisions are not fully compatible with
limiting nondiscrimination to either capital export or capital import neutrality.
As indicated above, we obviously agree, as one of the points in our original
article was that some cases point in one of these directions and others in the
opposite direction, leading to incoherent and inconsistent results.'
However, it seems equally obvious that the ECJ cases cannot be read as
implementing competitive neutrality, because the court has never indicated
that an unlimited foreign tax credit or "ideal deduction" is required by the
nondiscrimination standard. In considering locational and leisure neutrality,
Mason and Knoll test the ECJ jurisprudence against the actual analytical
requirements of those concepts, not against the partial standards they have
proposed for judicial interpretation. When considering competitive neutrality,
however, they use a different, much more lenient test, focusing on certain

151.

Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1089.

152.

Id. at

1098.

153. Id. at 1094.
154. Id. at 1095.
155.

Graetz & Warren, supra note

1, at 1216-19.
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language in the ECJ decisions to conclude that they are compatible with the
logic behind their partial version of competitive neutrality. 6 If, however, a
similar test were applied to all three concepts, the ECJ decisions would be
regarded as just as incompatible with competitive neutrality as with locational
and leisure neutrality.157
Having insisted that their preferred norm of competitive neutrality can be
found in the EU Treaties and cases, Mason and Knoll also assert that the
dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, promote that
standard as well."' As with the European court, this conclusion is both
normative and positive, and the discussion goes far beyond cases involving
cross-border workers. We have already indicated why we think the normative
case for competitive neutrality is inadequate, even given the authors' efficiency
norm. As for the positive claim that competitive neutrality explains the hitherto
confounding U.S. decisions, Mason and Knoll's analysis is remarkably limited,
spanning only a few pages and discussing only a couple of cases. Indeed, their
discussion of tax nondiscrimination in the United States focuses on the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, which they recognize does not even apply
to corporations,"' the principal litigants in interstate tax discrimination cases.
Moreover, although there may be Commerce Clause cases involving
discrimination that could, with the benefit of hindsight, be cast in a
competitive neutrality mode, the overwhelming proportion of interstate tax
discrimination decisions cannot fairly be read as saying anything about
residence or source. Rather, they reflect the view that Commerce Clause
discrimination "simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-

156. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1096.

157.We do not, for example, know of any ECJ case law that would support the conclusion that
the court would strike down an income tax that exempted foreign income and combined
graduated-rate source taxation of residents with flat-rate source taxation of nonresidents,
even though that system would apparently violate competitive neutrality, as defined by
Mason and Knoll. See supra note 135.
158. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1106-15. For a brief discussion of a few of the differences

between the ECJ's tax discrimination jurisprudence and that of the U.S. Supreme Court,
see, for example, Mason, supra note 46, at 1614-20 ("[T]he ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court
have come to somewhat different conclusions about what the tax nondiscrimination
principles of the EC Treaty and the U.S. Constitution mean . . . ").

159.

See Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1108-10; see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,

177 (1869) (concluding that "[c]orporations are not citizens within the meaning" of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause); i HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 148,
4.12-.13.
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state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter," 6 o for
whatever that is worth. Finally, even Mason and Knoll appear to acknowledge
that, unless and until the Supreme Court adopts their competitive neutrality
analysis, its jurisprudence may fairly be characterized as "a series of confused
and incoherent tax discrimination decisions.

,,

6

,

A convincing showing that competitive neutrality is the key to
understanding the Supreme Court's extensive nondiscrimination jurisprudence
would thus require a much fuller analysis of the very large number of relevant
decisions. In sum, Mason and Knoll's claims that their norm of competitive
neutrality follows from the text of the EU Treaties and the U.S. Constitution
and can be found in the ECJ and Supreme Court cases interpreting these
founding documents are simply not convincing.
VIII. COMPETITIVE

NEUTRALITY AS A WAY OUT OF THE LABYRINTH

OF IMPOSSIBILITY

Finally, Mason and Knoll insist that competitive neutrality, unlike
locational or leisure neutrality, offers a way out of the labyrinth of
impossibility. They sometimes present our point as limited to the conflict
between capital import and export neutrality (locational and leisure neutrality
in their terms) .,6' As we have clearly stated in everything we have written on
this subject, 6 , our criticism of the ECJ's approach to tax cases is more general:
the impossibility of requiring nondiscrimination from the perspective of both
origin and destination countries. The well-known impossibility of achieving
both capital import and capital export neutrality is just one example, albeit an
important one.
As our article was about the ECJ's jurisprudence, we presume that it is the
partial version of competitive neutrality that they formulate for courts that is
supposed to provide a way out of the labyrinth of impossibility. It is, however,
worth our stating why their full version of competitive neutrality does not
resolve the impossibility of applying a nondiscrimination principle in both
origin and destination countries in the absence of harmonization of tax systems
and rates, which is the proposition we reiterated at the beginning of this

16o. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). See generally
1HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 148, 4.14 (discussing case law).
161. Mason & Knoll, supra note 33, at 1111.
162. Id. at 1052 n.136, 11o5-o6.
163. Graetz & Warren, supra note 15, at

1622;

Graetz & Warren, supra note 1, at 1219.
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Response. i4 The full version of competitive neutrality contemplates
harmonization of all tax systems, but not rates, into one of two unrealistic
systems: (a) worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits or (b) twopart taxation of source and residence income, accompanied by either: (i) a
deduction for source taxes (paid at home or abroad) or (ii) an exemption for
foreign income.' Such harmonization obviously undermines the sovereignty
of the origin and destination countries that we postulated above. Moreover, as
Mason and Knoll recognize,' 6 6 their harmonized version (a) eliminates any role
for taxation of cross-border income in the destination country, as the country
of origin must credit or reimburse all foreign taxes. Version (b)(ii), on the
other hand, eliminates any role for taxation of cross-border income in the
origin country, which must exempt foreign income. Only version (b)(i)
maintains a role for taxes in both countries, but it creates a locational incentive
to invest or work at home or abroad, depending on relative tax rates, thereby
discriminating for or against cross-border movement of capital or labor. 6 7 This
distortion could, of course, be eliminated by harmonizing tax rates as well as
tax systems, but, as we have always said, harmonization of both income tax
bases and rates would avoid the impossibility result, but is unrealistic. Without
such harmonization, however, different tax rates distort people's choices about
where to live and work and companies' decisions about where to locate their
subsidiaries and their plant and equipment. And, as Mason and Knoll
acknowledge, neither the ECJ nor the U.S. Supreme Court has the power to
compel such harmonization.
Turning now to the partial version of competitive neutrality that Mason
and Knoll propose for judicial decisionmaking, their claim seems to be that it
provides a way out of the labyrinth because there is nothing fundamentally
incoherent about imposing requirements of uniform taxation on both source
and residence countries from the perspective of partial competitive
neutrality.168 Note, however, that they also assert that uniform residence taxes
maintain locational neutrality and that uniform source taxes (with no residence

164.
16s.
166.
167.

See supra notes

15-20 and accompanying text.
These requirements are summarized at Mason and Knoll, supra note 33, at

tbl. 5.

Id. at lo60-67.
That discrimination is shown in Mason and Knoll's Tables 3 and A by the higher pretax
wage in Germany. Id. at 1o66 tbls.3 & A. As the authors indicate, enough workers have
shifted their place of employment to lower-taxed France in response to the tax differential to
achieve the equality of after-source-tax wages shown in the tables. Id. at 1o65 n.16l; see also
id. at 1052 n.134.

168. Id. at 1105-06.
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taxes) maintain leisure neutrality,' 6 9 but they admit the impossibility of having
locational and leisure neutrality simultaneously."' Therefore, if both the origin
country and the destination country in a cross-border transaction are included
in the analysis, there is no escape from the labyrinth. As a result, Mason and
Knoll concede that their approach requires a court to consider only the laws of
a single country when evaluating cross-border transactions involving two or
more countries."' It is hardly surprising that analysts who restrict their
consideration to the laws of either the origin or destination country in any given
case will find the impossibility of requiring discrimination from the perspective
of both countries uncompelling.
As we indicated in our original article, our analysis, like the ECJ's, is not so
restricted because we view the nondiscrimination interpretation of the four
freedoms as protecting taxpayers against a higher tax burden for cross-border
income than for domestic income. 72 We also discussed an alternative, more
limited view that was not subject to our impossibility result. Under this
alternative view, which has a long intellectual history in the EU, 73
nondiscrimination would preclude a member state only from more heavily
taxing income that crosses its borders than income that does not. As with
Mason and Knoll's recommendation, such limited alternatives would look only
at one member state's laws and would not take into account the tax situation in
the other member state, recognizing that each member state imposes income
taxes on both a source and a residence basis. As one example of this approach,
we cited the conclusion of Wolfgang Schon that nondiscrimination only
requires (a) source countries to adopt capital import neutrality and (b)
residence countries not to unreasonably hinder the export of capital, whether
human or monetary.' 74 This prescription is very similar to (if not identical
with) Mason and Knoll's partial version of competitive neutrality, which would
require (a) source countries to adopt uniform source taxation and (b) residence
countries to adopt uniform residence taxation.'

169. Id. at 1072 n.171.
170. Id. at 1074.
171.

Id. at 1104-05.

17z. See Graetz & Warren, supra note i, at 1220.
173. See id. at 1220-21 nn.116-i8.
174.

Id. at 122o n.116 (citing, inter alia, Wolfgang Schon, Tax Competition in Europe-The Legal
Perspective, 9 EC TAX REV. 90, 97-99 (2000)).

17s. The definition used by Mason and Knoll for uniform source and residence taxes is set forth
supra note 134.
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As in our original article, we agree that these approaches avoid our
impossibility result. The rub is that they require the ECJ to restrict its analysis
of nondiscrimination to a single country, ignoring the tax system in any other
country implicated in cross-border commerce, a restriction that Mason and
Knoll regard as salutary.'17 Our own view is that any serious attempt to
identify the tax advantages or disadvantages for cross-border income should
take account of the tax consequences in both countries. In any event, as Mason
and Knoll concede,' 77 it is clear that the court does not consider itself subject to
any such restriction, as many of its nondiscrimination decisions involve
evaluation of the taxing systems in both source and residence countries. 178 As
Joachim Englisch has put it, "the ECJ has repeatedly held that a discriminatory
taxation of cross-border transactions in one Member State can be offset by tax
privileges granted in the other State with links to the transaction at issue." 79
The limited approach that Mason and Knoll recommend is thus not a way out
of the ECJ's labyrinth any more now than was the similar approach of
Wolfgang Sch6n when we wrote our original article.
Moreover, even if the court, contrary to its longstanding practice, were to
decide to restrict its requirement of income tax nondiscrimination to a single
country, we are skeptical that Mason and Knoll's partial competitive neutrality
would, as they claim, always provide "clear direction"i"o in difficult cases.
Reconsider two of the tax examples with which we began. Would an EU
member state (the destination country) be permitted to deny a tax exemption
to a charity organized (and exempt) in another member state (the origin
country) if the destination country treated all charities the same by requiring
them to meet its own requirements? That would seem to be the result under
the requirement of uniform destination-country taxation, but it would also be

176. Mason & Knoll, supranote 33, at 1105.
177.

Id.

178.

See, e.g., Case C-470/o4, N. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/Kantoor Almelo,
20o6 E.C.R. 1-7409 (exit taxes); Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005

E.C.R. 1-1o837 (deductibility by parent company of losses of subsidiary located in another
member state depends on treatment in other state); Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004
E.C.R. 1-7477 (stating that the dividend credit in the country of a shareholder depends on
the treatment in the country of the dividend-paying corporation). For other examples, see
Graetz & Warren, supra note i, at 1221 n.120.
179.

Englisch, supra note 45, at 16. Once both countries are considered, it becomes clear that
Mason and Knoll's approach would not create the "level tax playing field" between domestic
and cross-border transactions they claim to supply, Mason and Knoll, supra note 33, at 1021,
1096, because, as they admit, there would still be a "drag" on cross-border transactions, id.
at 1114.

18o. Id. at 1014, 1115.
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inconsistent with many ECJ decisions and EU practices that privilege origincountry laws by requiring mutual recognition. Would a country from which an
investment in corporate stock originated be required to grant tax credits to the
shareholders for corporate taxes paid to another country if it granted such
credits for purely domestic dividends? That would seem to be the result under
origin-country uniformity, but it would also result in favoring cross-border
transactions over domestic transactions if the country from which the
dividends were paid also granted a credit.
Consider, finally, a same-sex couple who marry in a member state
permitting such marriages and then move (for more than six months) to take
new jobs in a member state that does not permit such marriages. Would it be
permissible for the destination state to deny the newly arrived residents income
tax benefits accorded married couples on the grounds that all same-sex couples
are treated the same in that country? If not, the new residents would be better
off than same-sex couples that had always lived in the destination country. On
the other hand, the denial of benefits could create a disincentive for a same-sex
couple to move to another member state to take jobs for which they have a
comparative advantage. Mason and Knoll avoid such cases by their assumption
that taxpayers cannot change their country of residence. We, however, do not
see how a standard of competitive neutrality provides "clear direction" and an
obvious answer to this important, realistic question. 8,
CONCLUSION

Let us summarize our eight principal differences with Mason and Knoll: (1)
Their article adopts economic efficiency as the paramount criterion for
interpreting tax discrimination, but this is too restrictive a focus for
constitutional courts, because it would preclude member states from
adequately considering other important tax policy norms in writing tax
legislation. (2) The Desai and Hines capital neutrality framework for corporate

181.

Cf Case C-147/o8, Romer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (May lo, 2011),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80921&pagelndex=o&
doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part= 1&cid= 36 4 92 3 (holding that extension of
public employee benefits to different-sex married couples but not to same-sex registered
partners violates an EU directive prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation). Regarding a same-sex marriage recognized in one member state, the European
Commission's website contains the following statement: "In principle, your marriage is
guaranteed to be recognised in all other EU countries-but this does not fully apply to
same-sex marriages."

Couples: Marriage, YOUR EuR., http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/

citizens/family/couple/marriage/index en.htm
omitted).

(last

updated

Aug.

2011)

(emphasis
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taxation cannot be imported into the context of individual taxation without
much greater analysis of the differences between corporate and individual
behaviors and tax regimes. (3) The unrealistic assumption of fixed residence
confines the article's actual analysis to discrimination against cross-border
workers, so any broader claims about tax discrimination are not grounded in
the article's analytics. (4) The article never makes an adequate normative case
for competitive neutrality as the preferred economic efficiency criterion,
because the distortions that would be eliminated by competitive neutrality are
never compared with those that would be eliminated by other efficiency
standards, including leisure neutrality or locational neutrality. On its own
logic, the article therefore provides no reason to favor competitive neutrality
over the competing economic efficiency concepts it discusses. (5) The tax
systems required to implement competitive neutrality (universal adoption of
either unlimited foreign tax credits or the "ideal deduction" method) are not
realistic or practical."' The unrealistic assumption of flat rates for individual
taxation in the presentation of the ideal deduction method makes any policy
recommendations based on that deduction problematic. (6) Given the actual
requirements of competitive neutrality developed in the article, the partial
version that they urge courts to use is simply too attenuated to serve as a
compelling constitutional principle. (7) The positive case that the ECJ and the
U.S. Supreme Court are, and have been, actually engaged in promoting
competitive neutrality is not convincing in light of the article's limited analysis
of judicial decisions and the many counterexamples available. (8) Competitive
neutrality fails to provide a way out of the labyrinth because it entails either
harmonization, locational distortions, or effective elimination of either source
or residence country taxation. Partial competitive neutrality fails to provide a
way out because it assumes, contrary to the ECJ's decisions (and, indeed, to
our original description of the labyrinth itself), that the law of only a single
country is relevant to questions of tax discrimination in cross-border
transactions. Even on the assumption that the court would and should restrict
its consideration to the law of only one country, neither version of competitive
neutrality provides clear and acceptable answers in many difficult cases.
For us, then, competitive neutrality turns out not to be the holy grail of tax
discrimination. With respect to tax jurisprudence, the ECJ remains stuck in a

182. Ruth Mason herself recently recognized the impracticality of implementing the norm that
she and Michael Knoll are now urging the ECJ and U.S. Supreme Court to impose on the
EU member states and U.S. states. Mason, supra note 46, at 1581 ("[N]either LIN ["labor
import neutrality," here labeled "leisure neutrality"] nor LON ["labor ownership
neutrality," here labeled "competitive neutrality"] represents a practical policy goal at this
time.").
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labyrinth of impossibility because the logical implications of requiring
nondiscrimination in both origin and destination member states remain
contradictory and incoherent.
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